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In professing to call attention tc this often fcr- 
.gotten work of the great Scottish Philosopher one can- 
not help noticing how very similar the reception ac- 
corded to it by the outside world has been to its treat- 
ment at the hands of the author himself. During his 
lifetime he kept it in the safe obscurity cf his study 
drawer,w} ere it lay until the day cf his death. The 
plan of the Dialogues _iad been clearly thought out by 
Hume as early as 17bO and the active period cf his con- 
tribution to philosophy proper having closed almost in 
the same year this excursion of his into natural the- 
ology might most fitly have been presented to his 
readers at once, especially if,as it seems to us now,it 
may he rightly regarded as the crown and consummation 
of his earlier speculations. indeed some such concep- 
tion of the relation cf the , }ialogues to his other 
works underlies the outlining of his scheme upon its 
first page,where he founds his method "cn the saying of 
"an ancient (Chrysippus) '!hat students of philosophy 
ought first to learn Logics, then i'thics, next Physics, 
"last of all the nature of the Gods." 
From that year onwards however his literary 
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activity v,as directed into other and less speculative 
channels, and though the book undoubtedly existed in 
manuscript and was from time to time submitted tc his 
philosophical friends for their opanion, it WAS as good 
as lest for the estimating of his whole position by 
his contemporaries. in the inner circle of savants 
who were <aJuely a. are of its existence, considerable 
fear prevailed e a to what approaching cataclysm the 
appearance of the 'terrible David' upon the theological 
horizon might portend,and,as year after year passed 
safely b;,;, thei r distrust cf the threatened publication 
of his meaning only increased the more. When a book 
has such a history behind it there is naturally every 
reason to expect that its contents may have been varied 
considerably by corrections, ornissi one and insertions 
from the author's own hand. Alt provided always that 
the .manuscript coiy, (now preserved in the library of 
the .ioyal Society of r.dinburr h ), from which it was 
first published in 1779, was the originml draft, there 
can have been only the most trivial amendments and 
the main lines of the argument were left untouched. 
_,:r Hill ¡{urton's verdict* on this .tint is that, 
"while the sentiments appear to be substantially the samt 
"as when they were first set down, the alterations in 
"the method of announcing them are a register of the 
"improvements in their author's style for a period 
* Life of -urne, p. 323. 
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"apparently of twenty seven years." From what I have 
seen of the manuscript I shoald say first, that the 
alterations upon the face of it are largely verbal, and 
secondly, that this particular copy is of later date 
than that which Hume invited his friend Sir Gilbert 
Elliott to criticise in 1751. 
The question whether the whole work was ever sub- 
stantially recast in the years, during which Hume kept 
it by him, cannot be definitely answered here. If how- 
ever, in at least one letter the author asks for assis- 
tance and advice in the endeavour to render the argument 
on one side or the other "quite formal and regular" 
the possibility of a more or less thorough redaction 
having taken place must not be overlooked.' So much 
is certain that by retaining the book unpublished he 
had opportunity of bringing it to a higher pitch of 
perfection, and that, accordingly, its sentiments may 
safely be regarded as the mature expression of his re- 
ligious and theological opinions in strict accordance 
with his empirical philosophy. 
The motive that prevailed with him to hinder publi- 
cation seems to have been a strong sense of the incom- 
pleteness of his arguments, and, more particularly, the 
feeling often voiced by him that he had not done 
justice to that "genuine Theism the most agreeable 
Dugalà Stewart's Works, I, p. 603. 
"reflection, 'hìrich it is possible for human imagi!ìa- 
"ticn to suggest." He speaks of the 'natural pro- 
pensity of the mind' towards tha theistic argument from 
design in terms as warm as those of Kant who called it 
"the oldest, the clearest argument and most in conformity 
with the co;rmon reason of humanity." He and played 
the scant is too long in the public eye to care very 
much for the popular verdict or to share his friends' 
fear that he might incur increasing odium and obloquy. 
He knew that any orthodox conclusions he could offer 
in this theological essay of his would appear to 
k,eaìcus defenders of the faith only as Greek gifts, 
any that might sewn in the light of current opinions 
to be unorthodox could make him no new enemies. 
His abstract speculations on the logical methods of 
Reason had ended in his advocating " a mitigated scept i- 
c i s;z" or as it is also designated "uri academical ph i lo- 
soiihy" * and when himself was forced to become the 
pioneer cultivator of the broad field of human know - 
lei -e with the untried implement which he had long 
chosen for his can, the promise of a harvest of posi- 
tive results seems to have been difficult of realisa- 
tion. Whether "rlsme fe .. ed that the i?ialogues would 
offend his readers need not oe discussed when ve know 
beyond doubt that they disappointed his own expectations. 
Many an 01.1.18 magnum has been utterly lost to the 
1Jn 9u i ry X l i . iii . 
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history of literature from considerations exactly sim- 
ilar to these which weighed heavily upon HIume. 
So much is conjecture cuts what ever the reason may 
have ben, publicat ion was delayed until death overtook 
the author in 1776. In his will it was found that 
careful directions were given first to Adam Smith. Pro- 
fessor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow, and afterwards 
by a codicil to William Strahan,publisher in Londcn,to 
secure the bringing of the book to the light, a sum of 
£200 being set aside for the necessary expenses. Both 
these gentlemen were so much averse to acce;Aing the 
charge that finally Hume's nephew as residuary legatee 
took it in hand, "His testamentary iniunction directing 
"their publication was declined by Adam Smith. But 
"it was too peremptory not tc be obeyed by a kinsman 
"whom he had in some measure adopttu." * And so in 1779 
these long matured Dialogues at last became kart of 
the common inheritance of jhilcso1:Lt :-s. 
It is not nec'essary in this present Introd,.ction 
to give either particular or general details of Hume's 
life and philosophy; enough has been said to show 
low krecarious a chance of existence this posthumous 
literary child of his had,and how tedious the labour 
was that gave it birth. And the klace it was to take 
in the history cf philosoi by subsequent to 1779 was 
entirely ill aeecc'úance with its past. 
-1( Edinburgh Review, Vol. db p. 4. 
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The first edition appearing early in that year 
from the press of Robinson in London was rapidly 
followed by another reprint, with correction. In 
1733 the book was appended to a new edition of Hume's 
collected Essays printed for Cadell and Elliott, and 
thereafter it has been frequently republished along 
with these or other parts of his writings. As a 
separate work it has appeared once in England, in 137b, 
when it was used as one of a series of brochures 
issued privately in London by a Mr T. Scott in the 
interests of a Society of Freethinkers. It is not 
too much to say that, with the exception of this re- 
print unworthy in itself and by reason of the strongly, 
biassed remarks which introduce it "to the reading 
public," it has been completely ignored by those who 
have undertaken to supply English libraries of the past 
century with ready means of access to Hume's far 
reaching speculations. In the standard edition of 
Hume's Works by Green & Grose the only analytic notice 
of the Dialogues is contained in one singularly un- 
satisfactory sentence:'' "Although perhaps the most 
"finished of its author's productions, it has not 
"excited general attention, there seems to be a deep - 
"seated reluctance to discuss such fundamental ques- 
"tions." This curt dismissal cf the Dialogues con - 
stitutes a verdict upon students of Hume rather than 
* Volume III, p. JO (là9J) 
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upon their waster, but as a verdict it has ample justi- 
fication in history. In England it has been generally 
felt that there is pressing need cf an 'answer to Hume' 
in this particular- connection,but the temper of the 
early nineteenth century inclined to be impatient cf 
such a thorough investigation of the deepest principles 
of natural theology as was nec::ssary after the sifting 
criticism to which they had been subjected by the 
great Scottish sceptic, The watch dogs of the orthodox 
temple often bark at friends as well as foes. And 
to express sympathy with the sentiments of Hume,even 
those admittedly unanswerable,was to incur popular sus- 
picion such as always clings to the name of inquiry. 
In works professing to be animated with the genuine 
positive spirit, the easy well worn way of dealing with 
Hurne's theology has been to rank his speculations as 
a side issue, to dub the.: "Absolute Agnosticism: " or 
"Universal Scepticism" and the reader having been 
safely conducted up to the end of this philosophical 
cul de sac is invited to retrace his steps and pursue 
his light- hearted journey Cy some other route. 
The attack ui on the Dialogues we shall have to 
consider later but the curicus reauer may observe here 
of the timorous method of grappling with Hume's pro- 
blems that it prevails as much with his friends as 
his foes. Thus in 1316 a series of 'Dialogues on 
Natural and Revealed Religion", with the avowed object 
of defending, supllementing and enlarging the conclusion 
of Hume on principles similar to hie,was advertised to 
appear in Blackwood's Magazine* for the month of April. 
These Dialogues are represented as being conducted b 
the same Cleanthes,rhilo,and Demea,who figured in Homes 
work. The anonymous author is describes (falsely) 
as cr.e who died in youth not without high distinction 
among his contemporaries;" his papers have cane intc 
the editor's hands and it is promised that their publi- 
cation "shall be continued regularly'through twelve 
Numbers of the Ma,azine." Only two parts had appeared 
when on accouet of t'.e uneasiness they caused the edi- 
tor saw fit to retract his premise and without one 
word of explanation cr apclo ;-y to his readers their 
place in the next issue cf the periodical was fled 
uI with other matter. Twelve years later the subter- 
fuge of anomy:nity was cast aside and the Rev. Dr Robert 
Morehead t published these supplementary dialogues 
complete in book form with his own name on the title 
page. 
* Blackwood, 1318. April and Mage. 
Dialogues on Natural and Revealed Religion by 
Robert Morehead, D.D., Edin. 1330. (in twelve parts 
Nos. I and II almost literally from Blackwood April 
and May 1313.) This book deserves notice as a good 
commentary upon Hume's Dialogues, the only attempt of 
the kind known to the present writer. The scope of the 
argument from design is greatly extended. To the data 
allowed by Hume there are added as evidencing design 
"the laws of the procedure of the knowing mind as well 
"as the laws visible in creation." "the formation of 
When Hume's Dialogues appeared in 1779 his philo- 
sophy had already found many admirers in Germany and 
interrupted other slumbers than those of Kant. To 
quite a large circle of thinkers there this posthumous 
book was an unexpected but most welcome revelation. 
One in particular Professor Frnst Platner, afterwards 
best known for his pungent criticisms of the Kantian 
doctrines, undertook a translation into the German 
language immediately and published it with the ex- 
planation that it had been forwarded to him anonymously 
in 1781. The air of mystery so unfortunately associ- 
ated with this book was increased by his following it 
in 1783 with a Discourse on Atheism,' which is intended 
to mitigate the consequences of his translation. In 
the meantime another translation of importance in the 
history of philosophy had been prepared by ,T.A.Hamann. 
From his correspondence with his publisher we 1.arn 
general notions and associations" and even the bare 
facts of what Dr %!orehead calls "external perception " 
While with Hume there is evidence for the "natural 
attributes" of God and little or none for the moral. 
the Philo and Cleanthes of this later book are made to 
agree "to lay the foundations of the argument for the 
"moral attributes of the Divine Nature in the moral 
"perceptions of the human A few years later 
further Dialogues appeared from the same pen but their 
tone is entirely apologetic and not at all convincing. 
* Gesprach über den Atheismus. E.Platner, 1783. 
The preface runs: The occasion of this Dialogue is 
the publication of Hume's Dialogues, its intention, 
to provide a reply and perhaps to reply to Atheism 
generally. 
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that it* vas begun on 21st July 1780 and finished on 
8th August. 
Ac :ut this time too he heard of the other in- 
ten_Led translation and the news caused him to delay. 
Before September however of 1730 the manuscript of this 
translation had been submitted to Kant who was reatly 
struck with it and urged the sending of it to press at 
once. As time went on he wrote deplorin- its Zen 
ap; earance but now Hamann had taken fright at the pro- 
spect of his name being connected with such an infidel 
book, and after su"gest ing one or two fanciful de- 
scriptions of himself for the title page, he finally 
intimated to Kant his withdr; wal,because he felt an- 
other was undertaking "the difficult, dangerous and un- 
popular tusk." Only a few days after the passim; of 
this correspondence Kant began the com,,osition of his 
Critique of Pure Reason and through the history of 
this suppres:ied manuscript taken in conjunction with 
Kant's express references to the Dialogues in the 
Prolegomena, X the historical connection between ilume'b 
Sceptical Theology and the famous criticism of Rational 
Theology in the Transcendental Dialectic of the treat 
Oritique,is thoroughly well established. In this 
,Iamann's :¿chriften, edited by Roth 1821 - 43. VI, 
p. 153. 
1 Hamann VI, 19C. 
T Prolegomena, g)57, 58, 59 et passim. 
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latter we shall Fee how a great many of Hume's posi- 
tions are restated and his conclusions accepted ac- 
cording to Kant's understanding of them - only however 
to be circumvented in the peculiar fashion cf his new 
philosophy. And although Kant's reconstruction cf 
theology be considered ever so unsatisfactory, it is 
because cf the thorough way in which he and Hume before 
him had cleared the ground and sh ev:ed men the 'real 
point at issue,'* that the philosophy of either became 
the starting point for theistic speculation in the 
subsequent century and a half. Therefore just as it 
is possible in Germany for a cry to be raised from 
time to time of a "Return to Kant" so in Scotland 
there is always opportunity for a Return to ;ïuhie. f 
The result in the two cases will always be widely 
different for this reason that the Copernican revolu- 
tion in thought initiated by Kant makes it possible to 
break entirely with the past. It opened up the way 
to a brilliant series of speculatitie deductions in 
metaphysics and theology which all proceed alike upon 
one and the same method,namely,a mapi.ing cut cf the 
different spheres of consciousness, moral cr theoreti- 
cal, cognitive, or religious, as the case may he. 
* Kant and Hume compared in this respect. Flint's 
Theism, p. 389. 
The question in Germany is "as uns Kant sein kanni 
The popular question in English refers +c the past 
rather than the present, What has Hume been 
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With the Critique of Pure Reason an epoch 
begins for philosophy, in which every such investi- 
gation into the problems of natural theology as is 
contained in the Dialogues is at once pronounced to 
be incapable of producing any fruit and the whole 
argument appears as a beating of the empty air of 
illusion. But however closely every positive result 
for theology may be whittled down before the edr*_e of 
Hume's scepticism, he still stops short of Kant's 
Transcendentalism just in refusing to make that dis- 
tinction in our cognitive faculties which places 
theology on a different plane from all other knowledge 
and enables Kant to dismiss the question in its older 
form on the ground of its being misconceived and in- 
soluble, even while in the same moment he addresses 
himself to its solution un-ter his own restatement. 
Hume is concerned merely to sift the results of 
natural theology on his own principles, ami not to 
enter upon what Kant in contrasting his own treatment 
of the theological Idea with the Dialogues calls, "a 
"careful critique guarding the bounds of our reason 
"with respect to its empirical use and setting limits 
"to its pretensions." To be sure Hume's work limits 
the results of such use strictly enour*r; but Kant 
limits the use itself by denying it in theology al- 
together. 
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It is true that one of the interlocutors in the 
Dialogues contends directly for the inadequacy of human 
reason to the appre'.ension of sod's Being.' But this, 
the extreme position, is attributed,it seems designedly, 
to the weakest of the three aisputants and it would 
be hermeneutically impossible to read the whole book 
as if it led up to an absolute negation in this form. 
For although with the exception of the argument in 
the Dialogues, Hume does almost nothing to illustrate 
at length his already expressed idea of that system 
of 'Divinity or Theology', which he would save from 
the flames when running over the libraries of the 
past, he prescribes the conditions of such a system 
in words which are perfectly definite and which there 
is no good reason to regard otherwise than as sincere." 
"It has a foundation in reason so far as it is sup- 
"ported by experience; but its best and most solid 
"foundation is faith and divine revelation." It 
is only in strict accordance with the first of these 
conditions that in this later work of his we expect 
to find an honest endeavour to determine now greet 
or how small is the residuum of theological truth 
to which Hume will adr.,it that the natural 
reason working within the sphere of experience 
Demea "The nature of God, I affirm, from the 
infirmities of human understanding to be altogether 
incomprehensible and unknown to us" - "The infirmities 
of our nature do not permit us to reach any ideas, 
which in the least correspond to the ineffahl' sub- 
limity of the divine attributes." 
.. Enquiry IV. p.135. 
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can attain. The second, again shadowed forth in its 
closing lines, remains altorrether unfulfilled and in- 
deed the appeal to faith and revelation, which he 
more than once voices in passages where scepticism 
seems to hold undisputed sway over his forrral reason- 
ings on theologi -cal subjects, must only be taken to 
express just such "a natural sentiment" or "propens- 
ity" of feeling as may always maintain its place in 
the clearest mind along with an utterly opposed con- 
viction of the understanding. The inconsistency 
from a logical point of view may Le admitted by others; 
it may be explicitly present with the author in per- 
son as it probably was with Hume.' Put if that be 
so, it can hardly be set down as a futile concession 
to popular orthodoxy, least of all in the Dialogues, 
and it remains a fact to be reckoned with seriously 
in any comprehensive estimate of Hume's opinions. 
Still in the book itself the action of the dialogue 
proper stands altogether apart from this short, ill- 
defined and perhaps misleading reference to faith and 
a 'revelation' of some sort beyond, it is a plain 
painstaking attempt on Hume's part to discover what 
reasoned foundation, if any, he could allow for 
religion. 
Enquiry IV. 154 on Faith as a miracle "which 
subverts all the principles of a man's understanding 
and gives him a determination to believe what is most 
contrary to custom and experience.' 
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The literary form into which the argument is 
cast - that of dialogue, - though once a favourite 
method of conveying philosophical instruction, has 
not, always been imitated successfully in later timas. 
Two reasons ara stated by Hume for its ador_tion in 
the treatment of-his subject; first, that the con- 
versational method sheds a variety of lights upon a 
truth 'so cbvious' 'so certain' and 'so important' 
as that of 'the Being of a God'; second, that it al- 
lows the utmost play to opposing e ent imants in deal- 
ing wit}, questions so obscure, doubtful and uncertain 
as these of His nature and attributes. Both reasons 
can easily be illustrated and parallelled from numerous 
passages in Hume's writings. In the Dialogues all 
parties to the argument ar*ree in holding that of the 
existence of God there is no question whatever. Even 
the sceptical Philo following Lord Bacon, comperes the 
Atheists of his tima unfavourably with David's fool who 
said in his heart, 'There is no God' for they are not 
contented to say it in their hearts,but they also utter 
that impiety with their lips and are thereby guilty of 
multiplied injiscretion and imprudence. "Such people, 
"though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot me- 
"thinks be very formidable. "' After the same fashion the 
friend "who loves sceptical raradox3s" and takes the 
a 
Dialogues, Part II. 
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burden of maintaining the antitheistic argument in 
Hume's Enquiry, says . "The chief or sole argument 
"for a divine existence (which I never questioned) 
"is derived from the order of nature." In a private 
letter as early as 1744 he had defined his conception 
of religion as being,` "The practice of morality and 
"the assent of the understanding to the proposition 
"that God exists." This way be culpably scanty as 
a definition but in all his writings - without ex- 
ception - this one proposition is always adhered to 
and often affirmed to be in Hume's view a possibly 
sufficient foundation for religion. For example in 
a comparison of historical religions he says, "The 
"only point of theology in which we shall find a con- 
"sent cf mankind almost universal, is that there is 
"invisible intelligent power in the world. "t This 
last quotation rounds off the other references by 
introducing a new point of view ,but many other parallel 
passages drawn from Hume's writings might be used to 
show how firmly rooted is his purpose cf making rio 
question of the Tieing of a God. The theory of 
existence which underlies them all was first propounded 
Works, IV. p. 112. 
Burton's Life, I. p. 162. 
t Natural History of Religion, Sac. IV cf. also 
Sec. XV, "The universal propensity to believe in 
"invisible intelligent power." 
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in the Treatise of Human Nature: "'Tis evident that 
"all reasonings from cruses or effects terminate in 
"conclusions concerning matter of fact: that is 
"concerning the existence of objects or of their 
"qualities. 'Tie also evident that the idea of ex- 
istence is nothing different from the idea cf any 
"object and that when after the simple conception cf 
"any thing we would conceive it as existent, we in 
"reality make no addition to or alteration on our 
"first idea. Thus, when we affirm that God is exist - 
"ent we simply form the inea of such a being as He is 
"represented to us When I think of God, when I 
"think of Him as existent, and when I believe Him to 
"be existent my idea of Him neither encreases nor 
"diminishes. "* In thus distinguishing al] other 
attributes frcn the one attribute of existence,on the 
ground that the latter is no new or distinct idea in 
the object, Hume may be understood to minimise the 
theoretical importance cf c ery proposition concerning 
Works, I. pp. 334, 335. The word God occurs 
twice in the text cf the whole Treatise, - in the two 
sentences given above and once in a note. The phrases 
Deity, Divine Being, and Supreme Being are used only 
in discussing the Cartesian certainty of perception, 
and Spiroza's Pantheism. A great deal cf comment on 
the Treatise can be cast away at once by remembering 
this fact: e.g. , Green's Introduction 339, beginning 
"From the point that our enquiry has reached we can 
"anticipate the line which Hume could not but take in 
"regard tc self and Gcd." The truth is, a discussion 
of the theology of the Treatise would be quite conjec- 
tural and always has been such. 
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existence. When therefore the distinction is ap- 
plied .recially to the Being and attributes cf Jod, 
it undoubtedly lessens the positive significance of 
the assurance so often reaffir:ed in his latest work 
that at least there is a God. But haver explana- 
tion Hume might have at hand to place upon these 
simple words, his first reason for using the form of 
Dialogue is amply justified within his own philosophy. 
While then our author postulates in this way the 
validity of a belief in God's existence,he finds that 
questions of His attributes and His plan of providence 
in the world lend themselves most easily to argument 
and discussion. "These," he says, "have been always 
"subjected to the disputations of men." This his- 
torical reflection forms the second reason for his 
composing the Dialogues. Its sting lies in the 
truth of it. It came in the :Addle of a century 
fruitful in 'proofs' of the Divine attributes, from 
the pen of one who had made a careful comparison of 
the religious tenets of men in ancient, in classical, 
and in modern times. The conclusion of his Natural 
History of Religion shos how Hume grasped the fact 
of a widespread divergence of opinion, so that it is 
possible by "opposing one species of superstition 
"to another, to set them a quarrelling: while we 
"ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily 
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"make our escape intu the calm though obscure regions 
"of philosophy." Perhaps there is a strain of mali- 
cious mockery in these words, but they point to the 
possibility of such contrary viev.s as had come under 
Hume's notice being bet forth just as they are in the 
Dialogues with himself to pronounce a judicial ver- 
dict upon the merits of each. 
These then are the fundamental presuppositions of 
the whole book: first, the certainty of Gud' b exist- 
ence, and secondly, the right of philosophy to dis- 
cuss questions of His attributes? The two are per- 
fectly consistent with his attitude to both points in 
his other works, and at the came time they are in 
themselves complementary to each other. In a note 
added in the Appendix to the Treatise cf Human Nature 
both principles may he clearly traced, already prudent 
with the author and enaLling him after a Iashion, 
peculiarly satisfactory to himself, to claim to be a 
believer even in his most agnostic attitude towards 
God's attributes, "The order cf the universe proves 
"an omnipotent mind:- Nothing mure is requisite to 
"give a foundation to all the articles of religion, 
"nor is it necessary we should form a distinct idea 
"of the force and energy of the burreme Being. "1- 
Cf., the two presuppositions of Sutler's Analogy, 
"Taking for proved that there is an intelligent Author 
"of Nature and natural Governor cf the world." "My 
"design is to apply analogy to the subject cf religion 
"both natural and revealed." Introduction. 
I Works, T., p. 456. 
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For the task of advancing from these presupposi- 
tions to the systematic criticism cf natural theology, 
Huma introduces to his reader no fewer than three 
imaginary friends, Philo, Cleanthes and "emea vrhrse 
conversation together upon Natural religion he re- 
cords. Whatever_ classical reference there may ori- 
ginally have been in the names is entirely lost in 
the essentially modern drama in .,hich they play their 
part. 
* 
In form also the Dialogues have diverF-ed 
widely from any classical model. Though an echo of 
Cicero's De Îatura Deorum is occasionally heard in 
Hume's language,' and the subjects are really akin - 
Hume's plan of having each of the disputants to un- 
fold at length a tenable and complete system pre- 
cludes the use of that characteristic device by which 
the Greek and Latin dialecticians punctuate the 
Thus Cleanthes has nothing in comwron with Zeno's 
pupil of that name who presided over the Stoic School 
in the third century, B.C. Almost he only allusion 
to the nomenclature of the Dialogues occurs in a i.lay- 
ful passage of Hamann's Golgotha (1794) where he speaks 
of "Philo the Pharisee" having conspired with "Clean - 
"thes the Hypocrite, to deny all possibility of under - 
"standing God's nature. They looked for a new Para - 
"clzte the 'adventitious instructor' to dispel their 
"ignorance by Revelation." 
Cicero sums up t-:us, "Velleil ;c held Cotta's argu- 
"merts to be the truest: to me t.bose of Balbus seemed 
"more probable." and Hume's closing sentence is simi- 
lar, "I confess that upon a serious revie -.. cf the whole 
"I cannot but think that Philo's principles are more 
"probable than De:_ea's but that those cf Cleanthes 
"approach still nearer to the truth." 
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arguments of their 1P_ding figures with the assents 
and simple questions of a learner, whose experience 
of being led on irresistibly from point to point by 
the master -mind, is supposed to represent the reader's 
own. In Hume's book Cleanthes, Philo,and I`Pmea do 
not yield to one.another indiscriminately on the 
essential points of the argumer: . When they agree 
in their views they say so, when they differ they 
expound their differences, but none of them succeeds 
altogether in convincing either of the others, and 
therefore at the close of the Dialogues the reader 
is left with an uneasy feeling that none of the great 
questions raised have really received an answer. 
When many diverse views are propounded each so 
powerfully and all with so little agreement, it is 
difficult to say precisely which is meant to carry 
conviction. In consequence of this fact many 
critics of the Dialogues have not hesitated to 
ascribe to its author only some mischievous purpose 
of casting all fixed religious opinions into in- 
extrica`.,le confusion, and avoiding every expression 
of his own. Thus Professor Huxley whose weakness 
for fathering* his own agnosticism upon the great 
Scottish philosopher is predominant in his analysis 
of the Dialogues, says,' "One can but suspect that 
Hume, p. 157. 
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"Hume's shadowy and inconsistent theism was the ex- 
"pression of his desire to rest in a state of mind 
"which distinctly excluded negation, while it included 
"as little as possible of affirmation respecting- a 
"problem which he felt to be hopelessly insoluble." 
There can be no doubt that the Dialogues contain 
materials for constructing three perfectly distinct 
schemes of reflection on the rature of God, each more 
or less exclusive of the others and in as much as it 
is humanly speaking impossible for them all to spring 
from one brain without their having thoughts and ideas 
in common, it is easy to see that 'the a;ithor had a 
'certain amount of sympathy with all the characters: 
'and that each of them alternately mirrored his own 
'everchanj ing mood.' Parts too of his general doc- 
trines are worked in at length into the utterances of 
all three as was indeed unavoidable. Hume himself 
however helps the inquisitive reader somewhat farther 
than this. He invites him at the outset to contrast 
"the accurate philosophical turn of Cleanthes" with 
"the careless scepticism of Philo" and both of these 
"with the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of Demea." At 
the close in the passage already quoted (Note p. 20) 
he puts into the mouth of Pam philus, who reports the 
whole conversation, an explanatory statement that he 
agrees with Cleanthes rather than Philo and with 
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Demea least of all. Still it is only by following the 
argument from point to point, and noting those which 
are distinctly admitted on each side, that the ques- 
tion of interpretation can ever be satisfactorily 
solved. 
From the very first it has been the usual view 
of critics to identify the author's theological 
position with Philo's scepticism and perhaps only 
pith the most virulently sceptical parts of it. The 
notice of the book in the Gentleman's Magazine of 
nctober 1779, after mentioning the names of the 
characters, runs, "We need not say on which side this 
"sceptical metaphysician inclines the balance but 
"must observe that the weapons with which Philo 
"attacks the moral attributes of the Deity are the 
"same with those which were employed by Lord Boling- 
broke and were most ably parried by Bishop War - 
"burton." The polemical Priestley in Letter IX. of 
his Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever published 
in 17Rn, quotes "Philo who evidently speaks the sen- 
"timent of the writer." Kant, in his Prolegomena of 
17P4, regards Hume as speaking "in the person of 
"Philo against Cleanthes," and holds that view 
throughout. And a passage` frolr' a once popular 
book may he quoted at length to show as early as 17p1 
how strongly preconceived ideas of Hume's agnosticism 
Milner, Answer to Gibbon and Hume, (1781). 
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had influenced current verdicts on the Dialogues, 
"In his dialogues concerning natural religion we have 
the substance of all his sceptical essays and not- 
"withstanding his declaration at the close in favour 
"of Cleanthes, the natural religionist, it is evi- 
"dent from the whole tenour of the bock and still 
"more so from the entire scepticism of his former 
"publications that Philo is his favourite. sincerity 
"constitutes no )art of a philosopher's virt,ie." 
This is in that same vein of rejecting Hume's own 
evidence which prevails generally in criticisms of 
the self revealed declarations of his position that 
abound in his writings and letters. ''r palfour in 
his Foundations of Belief considers him an absolute 
sceptic and when confronted with utterances that 
point the other way he summarise: in one sentence 
the difficulty a whole century of philosophers have 
experienced in trying to believe him, "I think too 
"well of "ume's speculative genius and too ill of his 
"speculative sincerity." The meaning read into the 
Dialogues by an exclusive identification of Fume 
with Philo has maintained its place in the history 
of philosophy and may safely be said to be the only 
one that finds acceptance to -day. ranee or twice a 
voice has been raised to protest against it. Dugald 
Stewart aptly remarks that, "the reasonings of Philo 
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"have often been quoted as parts of rump's philo- 
sophical system although the words of Shylock or 
"Caliban might with equal justice be quoted as 
"speaking the real sentiments of Shakespeare.** 
Professor Campbell l'raser also finds in the Dialogues 
a groping after a final theistic faith such as he 
himself advocates. 1 But these partial acknowledg- 
ments of the unfairness of pre judging the effect of 
Hume's latest and most mature philosophical work 
stand in almost complete isolation from all other 
references to him and his speculations; they may 
serve here as a preliminary warnir.r to the reader 
that,alonr with much matter easily rrco-nised to be 
a recapitulation of the author's earlier opinions, 
he may find in the Dialogues consideratle m,,difica- 
tions in their restatement. 
The three characters introduced in the Dia- 
logues can be easily defined and classified without 
identifying any of them with any particular philo- 
sophical system known in history. Demea belongs to 
the class of orthodox theologians who distrust or 
discredit all attempts to rationalize the existence 
of God. He praises piety and disparages philosophy. 
He can cite all the divines, almost, from the founda- 
tion of Christianity to support the adorably 
Dissertation note C.C.C. 
Theism, pp. 7 -10 115 pp. 
2G 
mysterious and incomprehensible nature oi' the supreme 
Being. Human minds are finite, wee;, and blind and 
therefore with regard to reason hP is a Sceptic 
holding fast always to a peculiar religious Sense 
which alone gives us Truth. With Malebranche he 
calls God a spirit not so much in order to express 
positively what he is,as.in order to signify that he 
is not Matter. Language which has a plain reference 
to the state and situation of man ceases to have its 
earthy meaning when applied to the Deity and there- 
fore in religion he is a Mystic. He accepts the 
ontological proof of an infinite Deity in the form 
which proceeds by analyzing the idea of necessary 
existence and he accepts also the cosmological proof 
in that attenuated form which Kant rirhtly reduced 
to the same elements as the other. In his presenta- 
tion of both there is no specification of the world 
that actually exists, the premises of his arguments 
are the abstract ideas of existence in general, 
which lead the mind back irresistibly in Demea's 
logic to first Ideas as blank and colourless as 
themselves. For on his view the present actual 
order of things could not possibly serve as premise 
for any reasonable argument. It is nothing but 
vanity, imbecility and misery, it exists only to be 
rectified under other dispensations and in some 
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future period of existence and so with regard to it 
he is a Pessimist. 
This character is perhaps the most perfectly 
delineated of all three, nevertheless it is not the 
favourite by any means with the author and indeed it 
serves "mainly as a foil to the other two disputants. "' 
Hume chooses to regard Demea as a type of the popular 
philosophizer of his own day and the pictures drawn 
of him in that rôle may safely be taken to be his- 
torically accurate. 1':'ith consummate literary skill 
Hume lays special emphasis upon point after point of 
his self- complacent orthodoxy in which he is impli- 
citly a complete Agnostic. 
Cleanthes is a rationalist in the sense that 
has confidence in the natural operations of reason 
and believes in its capacity of attaining truth, 
provided it confines itself to the sphere of ordin- 
ary experience and the interpretation of that ex- 
perience. When he is confronted as he inevitably 
is in Hume's plan of the drama with the sceptical 
theory that all human knowledge is nescience, that 
'our senses are fallacious' 'our understanding 
erroneous' 'our ideas full of absurdities and con- 
tradictions,' he reverts to the commonsense point 
of view that its refutation must be sought by an 
Orr. Hume's Influence on Theology and 
Philosophy, p. 201. 
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a. peal to the procedure of ordinary life and practice. 
For such speculative reasoning undermines all posi- 
tive scientific truths alike. It is sceptical of 
every received maxim whatever. Therefore Cleanthes 
brushes it aside in the present task of exaniniru 
the grounds of a.natural theology. For him any 
system is better than no system at all. At every 
stage of knowledge belief must be proportioned to the 
precise degree of evidence available and 'natural 
propensity' will always incline his assent towards 
an affirmation, when there are some reasonable 
grounds for making it,rather than towards a suspense 
of judgment recommended only by an abstract and 
general distrust in reason. Having thus grasped 
the nettle firmly he turns away from these preliminary 
questions with an obvious measure of confidence to 
consider the outside world. In its workmanship he 
finds evidence of design clear and distinct, not 
dependent upon or needing demonstration, because it 
is as immediately given as the most vivid impression 
of the senses. He considers it proof of the exist- 
ence of a designing Mind which is a sufficient object 
to satisfy his religious wants. ?le has found a 
Deity and therefore he claims to be a Theist.* 
natural desire is to predicate infinite benevolence 
Cleanthes' Theism is really a form of Deism. 
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and love of his 'God and to this end when hP surveys 
the present order of things he would fain close his 
eyes and deny absolutely the misery and wickedness 
of man. By choice therefore he would if possible 
be a thorough going Optimist, but the facts are too 
hard for him, and,in the end he modifies his con- 
ception of God's goodness in creation end falls back 
upon the pious hope that in oth'r scenes the ills of 
the present may be rectified and the full fruition of 
human happiness and good may be attainJ. Throughout 
the book the speeches of Cleanthes are touched by a 
genuine en;otion and enthusiasm for his cause which 
apparently reflect the feelings with which Hume him- 
self professes to regard him. 
For constructing the character of Philo Hume in 
the first place/has recourse to all the more sceptical 
elements which characterise his analysis of the 
human mind in his earlier works. To him the natural 
reason is an object of distrust, it furnishes in- 
vincible arguments against itself ano all its own 
conclusions. It has especial difficulties in theo- 
logy because arguments there run wiae of conrnon 
life, get beyond the reach of our faculties and 
strive after conclusions which unlike those of 
political economy, ethics,and 'criticism' - the topics 
of Fume's later life, be it noted - cannot be verified 
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and tested by the senses and experience. A natural 
theology th,,refo ̂ e is impossible. Moreover it is 
meaningless. For it claims to make intelligible in 
the divine an orering power, which, as far as 
our knowledge of human reason goes is not known to 
be inherent in reason itself but may be derived from 
external principles of orderly arranger.:ent. Other 
natural powers too, that are altogether irrational 
are observed daily to issue in order, so that it 
smacks of partiality to ascribe the origin and 
maintenance of the unive=rse to any one of them 
rather than to the others. To Philo it appears at 
times that the order in Nature is much more easily 
explicable ry natural powers,than the design in 
Reason by rational powers and an orderly system 
therefore leads us to seek its cause in itself m.t 
in a designing mind. So far he is a 'Naturalist' 
and the question of a theology does not arise for 
him. Neither does that of a Theodicy. For in 
viewing the moral world he holds the balance evenly 
between regarding it as good or as evil. Fe leans 
to no extreme view either of itself or its causes. 
Morally they are indifferent, right and wrong are 
illusions; goodness or malice cannot be affirmed of 
either one or the other. 
But this description of Philo's position is 
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quite insurficient to account for the conclusions to 
which he eventually comes, it may be, inconsistently. 
Throughout the last three sections of the argument he 
expressly makes repeated admissions that there is 
evidence for a design, purpose, or intention,in !'ature. 
"It strikes everywhere the rost careless, the most 
"stupid thinker." "The suspense of jadr -ment" which 
is the triumph of scepticism: "is in this case im- 
"possible." "All the sciences almost lead us in- 
"sensibly to acknowledge a first intelli« ent Author 
"and their authority is often so much the f7reater as 
"they do not directly profess ti-at intention." "Here 
"then the existence of a DEITY is plainly ascer- 
tained by reason." These and other sentences are 
not the strictly logical result of Philo's orir*inal 
position; in the Dialogues considered as a lint *le 
book they plainly siírnify his partial ccquiescence 
in the contentions of Cleanthes. They are not the 
results we should naturally expect to be propounded 
by Hume from the standpoint of the Treatise or the 
Enquiry: therefore in his general philosophy, if 
they are to be taken as the sincere expression (and 
I think they must be) of his last word in developing 
his own doctrine, they denote in Hume a slz..ckeníng of 
his earlier scepticism - whether through the mellow- 
ing influence of time /or natural inclinationlor 
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reasoned cor"iction,it is hard to say. in any case 
both Cleanthes and Philo converge upon this measure 
of positive assertion and agreement. - of coarse from 
opposite sides - and to Philo it is the maximum he 
will allow in natural relip -ion. With the popular 
faith of his own .time Philo has nn sympathy whatever, 
and in this respect too he has Cleanthes with hip-:, 
both again representing the life long attitude of 
HUMP to what he always terms 'false religion.' 
Front what has just been said, the Dialogues ob- 
vir, sly afford a very pretty question of interpreta- 
tion. The problem however is s in.pl i f i ed in the end 
by Demea's abrupt disappearance from the stare, leav- 
ing the argument between Cleanthes and Philo. The 
initial alliance between Demea and Philo was one that 
could only endure/so long as the former remained blind 
to the consequences which his friend would infer from 
their common principles. A theology which starts 
from a doctrine of human ignorance, adcs to that, the 
doctrine that the present order is one of unmitigated 
evil and illusion and then concludes by affirming the 
Deity to be absolutely transcendent, is reduced at 
once under Hume's canons of Truth to absolute scep- 
ticisc!. It is usually unaware of its own implica- 
tions and Hume represents it so, therefore in any 
philosophical writing it would naturally be r-garded 
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as an inn rfect, and incomplete variation of a more 
reasoned theory, in Dialogue it can he developed into 
its final fora- with especial ease. This is exactly 
what happens in I:ume's treatment of the subject: 
Demea is a mere puppet in the hands of the more sys- 
tematic scepti ,and the issue of the whole argument 
may be said to lie between Philo and Cleanthes. 
From this general statement there must always be 
excepted that section of the ^ialogues which deals 
with the à priori proofs of god's rature. Part IX. 
of the book is an interlude in the dramatic action, 
much short Pr than the other parts and quite distinct 
from them in every way. Its omission woula not de- 
tract in the lease degree from the continuity of the 
argument, it is complete in itself and may properly 
be considered and disposed of separately. The a 
priori Proofs are put into Pem'a's mouth and on this 
one point he receives no support whatever from Philo. 
He is left alone to defend what is even for him an ob- 
viously ill - grounded inconsistency. And in a very 
few clear and pithy sentences Hume makes Cleanthes 
and Philo rive the whole substance of Ell the criti- 
cisms that have since been directed against the use 
of a priori reasoning* in speculative theology. 
Of the usefJlness of such reasoning.could it be 
validly admitted, there is no real doubt and two 
points with regard to it are absolutely determined in 
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Hume's analysis. It proves the unity of God's Nature 
and the Infinity of -is Attributes with a directness 
not to be found in any other topic. At the same time 
it requires a habit of thinkinc- so special,that it 
neither commands general assent nor awakens strictly 
religious feeling. Accordingly there are advantages 
and conveniences in it for theology if the solidity of 
its argument be left out of question, nevertheless 
even on that supposition it is too much out of touch 
with ordinary life to be very convincing or to butt- 
ress up practical religion. 
Hume leaves the dissection of the 'a priori argu- 
ments in the hands of Cleanthes. In the speech of 
Demea setting them forth two lines of proof are in- 
extricably jumbled torzether,one from the contingency 
of existence which impels the Hind to trace back the 
series of causes to u First which is its own cause, 
and another expounding* the implications of the Idea 
of a first cause who carries the Reason of his exist- 
ence in himself whose non- existence therefore is ex- 
pressly contradictory. This conjoining of the argu- 
ments con only distinguished as the cosmological and 
the ontological proofs of God's existence fores!iodows 
the Kantian procedure, the ways of stating them being 
identical and the criticises passed upon them having, 
considerable analogy in the two philosophers of 
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Scotland and Germany. Hume however, so far from in- 
troducing any particular preconstituted theory of the 
cE.usal nexus into his argument, as Kant does, treats 
the question in the Dialogues without reference to his 
own analysis of causes and effects or to any other. 
On the path of all causal reasoning which abstracts 
from the particular and seeks to predicate a Cause for 
Existence (or its equivalent the World) he establishes 
one grand dilemma wnicn bars that path effectually and 
finally. Two metaphysical presuppositions are poss- 
ible to him who would prepare premises for the Cosmo- 
lo,ical Argument, and each is an abstraction from ex- 
perience. Let that pass. On the first the world is 
conceived as an eternal succession of objects linked 
to ̂ ether temporally by a chain of relationjin which 
each is at once effect of a preceding cause and cause 
of a succeeding effect. To this "ume objects that it 
leaves no room for a rrius and therefore it seems ab- 
surd to enquire for a rrimum. The regular process of 
tracing natural causes,which in the Dialogues at least 
is recognized as quite legitimate,is under this pre- 
supposition taken to have universal application while 
at the same time it is for theolor!ical purposes aban- 
doned and the maxim, every effect must have a cause, 
Vide Caliecott and ?Mackintosh, Theism, p. 193 
and p. Also specially Kant's first and fourth 
Antinomies. 
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is in the end pronounced self contradictory. 
On the other presupposition what Fume calls an 
arbitrary act of the mind units all the particular 
parts of the temporal succession into a Whole, which 
is then said to want a cause. "Did I show you," 
says Cleanthes, the particular causes of each in- 
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dividual in a collection of twenty particles of matter 
"I should think it very unreasonable should you after - 
"wards ask me what was the cause of the whole twenty? 
"That is sufficiently explainei, in explaining. the 
"cause of the parts." This impugns directly the 
logical possibility of concPiving the' world as a unity. 
It is the same argument as occurs in the Treatise.' 
"Twenty men may be considered as an unite. The whole 
1;á1obe of the earth, nay the whole universe, may be 
"considered as an unite. That term of unity is 
"merely a fictitious denomination." For Pume there- 
fore this form of cosmological argument begins by 
putting forward most questionabl^ premissns and in 
addition to this objection,which is urged from his own 
peculiar standpoint, he proceeds to attack its method 
of drawing conclusions from them. The object of the 
argument expressly is to establish the Infinity and 
Unity of the Deity. But these two qualities are in 
the first instance surreptitiously ascribed to the 
Works, I. p. 338. Part II. 2. 
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created world, which accordingly might perfectly well 
be the only self existent Being. Whatever argument 
for the existence of God adopts as its method the 
ordinary category of cause, is bound to assume for 
the world the very qualities it wishes to prove for 
the Deity, and to -Hume in his most agnostic mood all 
such arguments appear reaucible to pure naturalism or 
materialism. 
In the ^ialogues therefore, the Cosnolor-ical 
argument which as }-:ant says professes 'to begin with 
'experience and is not completely à priuri,' is shown 
to derive all its nerve and force not from its sup - 
possea solia basis in a reference to the real world 
but from metaphysical presuppositions which have 
transformed that reference into abstractions that 
seem to Hume altogether apart from experience and 
imaginary. Iie is not content, however, with merely 
detecting this sophistical illusion in the argument 
but proceeds to give it a turn that is distinctly 
antitheistical. In endeavouring to link God and the 
world together as cause and effect, the mind wavers 
between two views of that relationship as it is evi- 
denced in creation. Either the present order is 
equated mechanically to its cause, in which case, 
being the better know it merits the more adoration 
in itself and can be so regarded as to exclude any 
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inference to God, or else it is arbitrarily taken to 
be cent !_rent and insufficient in its existence to 
be real and then Hume holds that this arbitrary judg- 
-, e:.t may as easily re passed upon God's Being as upun 
that of the world. In both respects Hume's trenchant 
criticism is most-effective, and while it will still 
be possible to enquire whether the more refined analy- 
sis cf the concept ui' cause in modern tirues has en- 
ables theology to rehabilitate such a rrumel, t, it is 
necessary here oi.cz more to emphasise the fact that 
Hume's treatment of it is in no way dependent upon the 
limitations either cf his own outlook or cf that of 
his time. 
The remaining parts cf Jemea's argument make no 
pretence cf appealinr to our experience and t,re purely 
à F riori. In very few words his reasoning runs, "We 
"must have recourse tu a necessarily existent Being 
"..ho carries the REASO1 of his existence in himself, 
"and who cannot be supposed r:c` to exist without an 
"express contradicticn. There is consequently such 
"a Being: that is there is a Deity." This i rocess 
of speculation is dealt with in the most summary 
fashion by Cleanthes whose words so obviously express 
all that Hume has to say on the matter that they may 
be quoted in full. "Nothing is demonstrable, unless 
"the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing that 
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"is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. 
"Whatever e conceive as existent we cae alse cori- 
"ceive as non existeet. Thera; is no being therefore 
"z.hose non xistence implies a cor,tredicticn. Con - 
"segeently there is ne ,:leir.g whose existence is de- 
"monstrahle. I propose this argument as entirely 
"decisive and am willing to rest the whole controversy 
"upon it." 
The method therefore of such argument is rejected 
by Hume almost contemptuously: he is altogether out 
of sympathy with the very possibility of it. But he 
alsc brings his own theory of "necessity" to bear 
upon the idea of necessary existence as it is predi- 
cated cf the Deity, his purpose being tc prove how 
naturally it affords an inference directly opposite 
to the religious hypothesis. Mathematical necessity 
depends upon ideal relations and fyr Hume is more 
easily ascribed to the propositions of alrebra (and 
arithmetic), where the mind deals with its own abstrac- 
tions than to those of geo:: etry for which Hume could 
account only with great difficulty. And "necessity" 
in Mathematics is so obviously independent of the 
question of the existence of objects, that the theo- 
logical use cf that idea to illustrate some occult 
Treatise, Part III., Sec. I. 
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quality in Gcd involves an application of the terni 
that is altogether new. Both Clearathes and Philo 
take their stand upon the nature cf Mathematical 
Necessity, Kant ir. a parallel rassar -e calls 
"this logical necessit,, the source cf the ,~ reatest 
"delusions." Cle-anthes is content to point out that 
"necessity" is a terni valid only in defining the rela- 
tions of ideas: "we lie under a necessity of a1..ays 
"conceiving twice two to be four." Existence is a 
term used only in dealing with 'matters cf fact.' 
The words, therefore, necessary exi: tence, have no 
meaning; or, .':ich is the same thir.c-, none that is 
"consistent." Philo roes on to point cut the dangcr 
of introducing the idea of necessity at all into our 
cosmology where it ':.ay lead as easily to a natural is:'1 
of necessary lass as to a theism. In :liatne!iatics 
every theorem that is proved states a necessary r ro- 
perty of the o1 jec s to ich it apj li s, and there - 
fcre,however much regularity .nd order and beauty 
there may be in any cf its problems, i t i s always 
possible to demonstrate that every appearance of de- 
sirn is in reality the work of blind necessity. It 
might easily be the case that,just as the most com- 
plex arithmetical series to a skilled calculator is 
an immediate deduction from `. 'he simple uninspiring 
rule that cne and one ake taro, so the whole economy 
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of the universe if = are tc ask why it must be tat; 
it is and not ctherr,iee,can be referred back to pre - 
vicus states which for natural science render it ab- 
solutely impossibly that any other Jis_.usi' t '':an 
the present should ever have coma to pass. 
And because science has a perfect right to sub - 
jact all its objects without exception c the power 
of thus deducing their necessity/it 'lié.Y with some 
appearance of ,ju tice cohvtrt this principle of its 
own method into a universally valid postulate. A 
mathematician who obse ry :s that the d is ,or:al of a 
square or the c i rcumf rer:ce of a circle bear a fixed 
relation to the magnitude of the circi: or the dia- 
meter respectively, and are at the sane time incom- 
mensurable with these latter, considers himself jus- 
tified in takin` this relation to he tx nacesuary one 
and s at.s about 'roving it .: i thout any fu r`,he r pre- 
liminaries. if as in th à priori arg'i en,t this 
same idea of a necessary .xister.ce i introduced in a 
scientific view of the cr a`ed rorld, He points out 
that no room ,eha Lever is left fcr a :.yl c then i s of 
design. This hypothesis being all important for 
an empirical or nattva1 theology, Hume rejects the 
ontology ical argument on every point; his explanation 
of its common acceptance simply is that 'a habit of 
thinking' appropriate in mathematics has been "trans - 
" ferrad to subjects where it ought not to have place." 
4 r
Such is Hu^se's t. ri t icisii of the cosmological and 
ontological arguments as he conceived either them or 
the rrinciples on w ich they rest. The subsequent 
history of philosophy may he searched in vain: for any 
attempt_ to meet it fairy; ,and squarely. It is the 
final and irrevocable judgment of empiricism upon à 
;riori arguments in theology ana. even when his general 
principles or evert when other of his conclusions 
have failed to commend themselves to a later aye, it 
at least has never been formally appealed against. 
"Theism," says Professor Fli -.t, "is not vitally in- 
"t,!rested in the fate of the so c:ll.:,i Friori cr 
"ontological arguments,"* and this remark well des- 
cribes the resignation with which modern thought has 
viewed their disappearance. 
Since Hume ' ;rote his Dialogues, argument f an 
ontological type has been concerned with a question 
at once more comprehensive in Its bearings and more 
definite in its formulation, namely the investigation 
of the fundamental relations of all thought and all. 
existence. The primary and n2cessury principles GI' 
knowledge have to he recc'xil .1 at every joint with 
the self existence of Reality if knowledge is to he 
accepted as true and not illusory. This question 
Theism, p. 267. 
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includes the older enquiry as to the existence of a 
Deity corresponding to the ideals of Reason,and like 
it demands an answer from the analysis cf the im- 
plications of thought itself not from anythir.E- that 
is given in sense or comprehended by understanding. 
It is more concerned however to sjiri tualise the uni- 
verse as an object of knowledge than to co, -nice an 
individual cr personal spirit in it. Hume's dif- 
ficul:ids for theistic speculation are circuiivented 
therefore by stating them on the rraI,d scale as ob- 
jections to the aprrApension of the most simple matters 
of fact. When this is doled, a dilemma is established 
between our believing, the r.Litld to have a natural cre- 
dibility in virtue of its ovin essence and our affiru- 
ing it dogmatically to be without rela l. i ors to any real 
Being Whatever. And so all the points touched upon 
by Hume receive one by One a bolutioriv in which his 
distinction, between "ideas" and facts, between "prin- 
"ciples of union among ideas" and "natural relations" 
disappear. Thus for Herbart, causal connection re- 
duces to a purely logical form, for Lotze it is the 
evidence directly given of a "supernatural sustaining 
"power immanent in all existence and oT :erat iv e in all 
change," in the revealing activity of one P.:rson to 
another, and so for these and all similar systems the 
whole of the theory of knowledge J Tends upon 
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ontolorical argument. The idea of God like ether 
ultimate truths is intuitive; it is the ..ork of 
"objective reason;" it is a presupposition cf thought; 
or it is the unity cf thought and being on which all 
individual theurht and existence rest. There are 
many possible alternatives for such speculation when 
it takes upon itself to become theological but all 
are linked together through their common starting 
point in the endeavour to prove consciousness and 
its real content to be a harmonious and indivisible 
whole. Suppose now that this basis be granted and 
that it be founa sufficiently trustworthy, then the 
argument to the existence cf Gcd does proceed upon 
the familiar lines cf the old cosmological and onto- 
logical proofs ánú resembles them closely enough to 
pass for a serious attempt at reconktrueticn. It 
proves God's existence by invoking the necessities 
of human reason, it deduces His Personality from the 
needed completion cf all cur conceptions and it as- 
cribes attributes to Him which are not by any means 
to be verified in cur passive experience cf any known 
objects (the created World), but are implied in our 
outgoing self -realising activity. And once this 
stream cf á priori reasoning ie in full flood it were 
in Hume's own vivid phrase "to stop the ocean with a 
"bulrush" to urge the considerations which had sufficed 
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in the Dialogues for diverting its first courbe. 
Nevertheless whenever any serious attempt it made to 
expound or illustrate or defend the unity and harmony 
of the ideal with the real, the argurner t cannot but 
take upon itself a teleological form. It can easily 
be classified under this heading and probably such 
reasoning is invested with its peculiar charm for 
speculative thought solely through the considerations 
of design, ir. mind and external reality which it un- 
doubtedly contains. 
In the Dialogues with the exception of the few 
sentences of part IX, which deals expressly with the 
á priori arguments, the treatment of Hume's subject 
is concerned entirely with an analysis of the teleo- 
logical argument. The á priori proofs being ruled 
out, the whole book is dominated oy Cleanthee steady 
insistence upon this one foundation for nis Theism. 
"By this argument à posteriori and by this argument 
'alone, do we prove at once the existence of á Deity 
'and his similarity to human mind and intelligence," 
.t 
(392), accordingly the sole question is as to the 
possibility and accuracy of this proof. If, however, 
Cleanthes admits only one form of argu!!ier.t he repre- 
sents it to be so Kide as to be all -inclusive. In 
From this point referenc ;s to the Dialogues will 
be given to the pati ing in Green and Grose directly. 
46 
different passages he appeals to "the whole world and 
"every tart cf it," "the image of mind reflected on 
"us from innumerable objects" "our immeasurable de- 
"sires of good" "the operations of reason" and in 
fact to all actual phenomena of experience, external 
and internal alike, as affording material for his 
hypothesis of design. To begin with, therefore, 
the scope cf his proposed theme knows no limits. 
Again an obvious consequence of the book falling 
into the literary form of dialogue is that the argu- 
ment for a natural religion in it undergoes a process 
of gradual development and refinement in the course 
of the conversation. Simple and ill- defined concep- 
tions are succeeded by others more complex and more 
accurate as the conversation proceeds each of the 
speakers contributing something to the final result. 
On Cleanthes alone lies the burden of maintaining the 
positive conclusion. The other two are on the 
negative side. If there is any continuity in the 
book an impartial analysis ought not to be adversely 
affected by the progressive restatement,which naturally 
ensues cf the position cf each. Cleanthes for ex- 
ample gives up a notable part of his original scheme 
when he abandons the possibility of tracing design 
in the moral world. Philo in turn by reason of the 
admissions he .cakes to him at the close of the argument 
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cannot be supposed to retain his scepticism unbroken. 
Each of the t.o is in many different points corrected 
by the other. 
The drama opens with a very complete statement 
of the purely sceptical theory of human knowledge 
from Philo and Den?ea. Our natural reason is subject 
to "uncertainty and endless contrarieties" not only 
in science but "ever_ in subjects cf common life and 
"practice." (381). The science cf quantity alone 
has any pretence cf certainty and, even in its error 
and contradictions are more abundant than truth. 
These are the old commonplaces of Hume in the Treatise 
when he takes that intense view of reason to which 
he is impelled as a philosopher and in opposition to 
it Cleanthes reminds him of the sentiments of his 
spleen and indolence which he had there confessed to 
govern his life as a man; how "it is impossible for 
"him to persevere in this total scepticism or make it 
"appear in his conduct for a few hours": the bent cf 
his mind relaxes and his conduct is so obviously sub - 
ject to a necessity to believe that his scepticism 
appears to others pretended and insincere. 
Here then in the Dialogues the two opposing 
elements in which Hume's theory of knowledge liad 
ended, the enthusiasm of abstract speculative negation 
and the instinctive determination to live and act by 
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ordinary maxims are restated exactly - almost in the 
same language - as in the last section of the Treatise 
on the Understanding. There Hume in his single person 
makes no choice,and indeed prides himself upon the 
fact that because it is a choice 'betwixt a falsa 
reason and none at all' he can regard it with indif- 
ference. But hare and now the choice is made defi- 
nitely by Philolthe scepti c,,hi!nself1and the balance 
on which judgment formerly was suspended inclines 
ever so little - to the side of belief iiri common life." 
It is necessary to note exactly how much he will ad- 
mit because it is through the very first chink in the 
sceptical armour so perfect before that Cleanthee 
pushes home his thrusts. The words of his present 
confession are "To wiiatevr length anyone aay push 
his speculative principles of scepticism, he must 
"act, I own, and live and conv:rse; and for this 
"conduct he is not obliged to rive any other reason, 
than the absolute necessity ne lies under of so doing." 
(384) "The sceptical reasonings" are "so refined and 
"subtile that they are not able to counterpoise the 
"more solid and more natural arguments, derived from 
"the senses and experience." Philo therefore lays 
aside the pretence of absolute scepticism for prac- 
tical life and conduct, and also,what is more important, 
for his consideration of trie sciences commonly called 
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'natural'. "So long as We confine our speculations 
to trade or morals or politics or criticism, , ;e make 
"appeals, every moment,to commonsense and experience, 
"which strengthen our philosophical conclusions and 
"remove (at least, in part) the suspicion, which we 
"so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning, 
"that is very subtile and refined." And a fever pages 
later,after Clearthes has clinched this concession, 
he refers more boldly still to "those suggestions of 
"the senses and common understanding., by which the 
"most determined sceptic must alloy; himself to be 
"governed." (399) One cannot help feeling that Hume 
is here alloying that very ground for an ans-uer to 
himself which was almost simultaneously being occupied 
by Reid for his Philosophy of Common Sense. 
It is however unnecessary to ask how far this 
position differs from the doctrine of the Treatise, 
because it appears that Philo having admitted this 
much positively in the Dialogues is immediately 
carried one step further. For a single moment he 
excludes theology from the favour yielded to other 
sciences. In theological reasonings we have not the 
advantage of an appeal to sense and experience. 
"We know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar 
"methods of reasoning in such a subject; since even 
"in common life and in that province. which is peculiarly 
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appropriated to them, we cannot account for them and 
"are entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity 
"in employing them." 
Cleanthes at once questions the validity of 
this distinction. For hire a "natural religion" is 
bound to put itself strictly into line with all 
natural sciences whatever. "In vain would the sceptic 
"make a distinction between science and common life, 
"or between one science and another. The arguments 
"employed in all, if just, are of a similar nature, 
"and contain the same force and evidence. Or if 
"there be any difference among them, the advantage 
"lies entirely on the side of theology and natural 
"religion." 
He divides the various systems of scepticism 
that seem possible to him into three classes. One 
is fatal to "all knowledge" and not to religion spe- 
cially. It is absolute agno ticism which discusses 
no evidence in any particular case b:it dismisses 
everything as uncertain or insoluble. Without any 
breach of courtesy to his companions he can liken 
this way of thinking to the brutal and ignorant pre- 
judice which the vulgar entertain to everything they 
do not easily understand. The most generally accepted 
results in science depend upon elaborate gains of 
minute reasoning and yet because they are so abstruse, 
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they are not one hit less securely established than 
the plainest experimental deduction. And for his 
own argument he promises by anticipation that it will 
be of the simplest and :cost obvious kind. If "the 
general presumption against human reason" be made a 
plea against natural religion,there is neither need 
nor opportunity to proceed further; but this is the 
very presumption -. vhich Philo has put away from him- 
self and therefore the only possible method for "the 
"most refined and philosophical sceptics" is to con- 
sider each particular evidence "apart and proportion 
"their assent to the rarticular degree of evidence 
"which occurs." To the general question of the bare 
credibility of our knowing faculties Cleanthes has 
his own answer. If that be allowed to arise a prob- 
lem is set of which he says, "I hava not capacity for 
"so great an undertaking: I have not leisure for it: 
"I perceive it to be superfluous." Superfluous it 
certainly was in the discussion between himself and 
Philosif the latter was willing to abide by the 
statements he had already made. 
Besides this form of total unbelief Clcauthes i. 
considering the possibilities of scepticism makes a 
distinction between two other forms of it very aptly 
described by Philo as "religious") and "irreligious" 
or as the modern phrase is 'antir:liRious' scepticism. 
\ % .K 
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The first, which exalts the certainty of Theology and 
distrusts the common sciences is the most objectionable 
to Hume. It lends itself easily to priestcraft 
which he held in steady abhorrence and so far as it 
is the motive of Demea's contentions in the Dialoc-ues 
it issues in irrational obscurantism and r caivas 
the full force of Hume's satire. Philo seems up 
the verdict for Cleanthes in one sentence, "If we dis- 
"trust human reason, v.e have now no other principle 
"to lead us into religion." 
There now remains the third form, namely that of 
"irreli7ious" scepticism which may depend upon the 
most varied gro.r.ds, but must at least give its 
reasons when called for. To it Philo declares him- 
self to adhere and he states the considerations which 
determine him to it as plainly as possible. "In 
"reality Cleanthes there is no need to have recourse 
"to that affected scepticism so displeasing to you 
"in order to come at this determination. Our ideas 
"reach no farther than our experience. We have no 
"experience of divina attributes and operations. I 
"need not conclude my syllogism. You can draw the 
"inference yourself." (391 ) With this acknowledg- 
ment the preliminaries may be considered settled by 
mutual consent, and the ground is cleared between the 
two principal disputants. The question of the natural 
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fallibility of human reason is waived and remains so 
even when at various points later Philo indicates 
implicitly the possibility of reviving it. What 
remains to be argued is whether Experience,the sole 
fountain of truth,yields any evidence whatever apposite 
to the theological inference, and the question if such 
evidence can be legitimately converted into proof. 
For a starting point in his construction of a 
teleological view of the world Cleanthes adopts one 
of the popular deistical conceptions of the eighteenth 
century. The universe is "nothing but cne great 
"machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser 
"machines, which again admit of subdivisions" apparently 
to an unlimited degree. This familiar figure of 
speech is not intended to express more than the fact 
of ubiquitous order and because of its common use in 
contemporary theological essays, both Cleanthes and 
Philo set themselves to the task of stating the argument 
depending upon it before the discussion begins. Fach 
gives a short summary and each agrees that the other 
has not done injustice to its ordinary statement, 
Philo saying (394) "I must allow that he (Cleanthes) 
"has fairly represented that argument" while Cleanthes 
assents (39b) that Philo "has made a fair representation 
"of it." We can therefore draw upon the speeches of 
both for a form:;.l analysis of its successive steps. 
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The fact of order in the world is admitted; but this 
is'not of itself, any proof of design.' We can only 
say that as it occurs throughout all nature, order or 
adaptation or adjustment resembles the productions 
of human contrivance. Only experience can inform us 
at all of the causes of such order; and as we find by 
experience that the plan of any work of human art, a 
watch, a ship, a house, is first formed in the mind, 
so we concluae that without this preparation such things 
would for ever remain untreated and unknown. Therefore 
by Analo ;y we conclude that the original principle of 
the universe lies in u designing m.nd. The causes in 
each case must be of the same kind only proportioned 
each to its several effect.` The whole argument 
undergoes considerable development in Hume's hands and 
obviously it is stated only as a convenient and easily 
recognised scheme upon which he can graft his own 
criticisms. In particular the questions of the nature 
of 'analo;,;,' and of the 'proportion' it involves are 
This representation of analogy as involving 'a 
proportion' is borrowed from Butler. -:ant also, 
speaking of the physico- theological argument in the 
Critique, says "We infer from the order and design 
"visible in the universe as a disposition of a thorough - 
"ly contingent character the existence of e cause pro - 
"portioned thereto." In a note to the Prolegomena 
( 58 dealing directly with the Dialogues) analogy is 
treated in a formal illustration, "As the welfare of 
"children (_a) is to the love of parents ( =b) so is 
the welfare of men (_c) to the unknown in God (_x) 
which we call love. 
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left open and admit discussion at once. 
The unavoidable uncertainty of analogy in every 
science is an immediate objection to its use. To 
stronger evidence than perfect si:ailarity in two cases 
of the same nature is 'ever deli -ed or sought after,' 
but wherever there is difference and alteration analogy 
is weakened and its conclusions do not command confidence 
in the same degree. It demonstrates only probabi- 
lities and therefore it is essentially a method of 
deduction to be entered ui en with the slow and deli- 
berate step of philosophy and not in uncritical haste. 
Philo questions its validity in the present case for 
three distinct reasons stated briefly in Part IF of 
the Dialogues. In the first place there is no proof 
offered of the si:ailárity between the universe and 
the productions of human cont rivancej as there ouht 
to be in face of apparent dissimilitude. In the 
second place other natural powers than reason are ob- 
served at work in the mechanism of the universe and 
therefore unless something determines us in favour 
of one particular principleiwe could not pretend to draw 
an analo:;y from the operst i ns of any natural power in 
its own peculiar sphere or infer it to be the 
First Cause of all. And lastly our experience ex- 
tends only to a small part of the universe and to 
a very short period of its existence, the inference 
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sought to be drawn in theology is one as to the cause 
of the Whole from the beginning of all. time. 
The second object ion) very briefly stated here 
contains the nerve of all Philo's argument in Parts Iv- 
VIII and if its consideration be deferred until we 
treat of them,we only follow Nume's own plan. The 
last objection receives its answer at once; for as 
it is worded in the Dialogues Fume describes it quite 
justly to be brought forward "somewhat between jest 
and earnest." 
Philo has reached the point of saying that for 
his op orient "it were requisite that we had experience 
"of the origin of worlds; it is not sufficient, surely, 
"that we have seen ships and cities arise from human 
"contrivance" and demanding how the theistic inference 
can be confirmed by repetition of instances and ex- 
periment. gut the conditions imposed by this demand 
are obviously incapable of fulfilment; they put an 
impossible meaning upon the word experience and 
1leanthes points this out perfectly clearly in reply, 
"mo prove by experience the origin of the world is not 
"more contrary to common speech than to prove the 
"motion of the earth from the same principle." Our 
experience is limited in space, and in time, and in ex- 
tent, we cannot better it but this fact alone can- 
not invalidate our right to infer a meaning in 
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what we do know. 
Philo, like Huine's imaginary o;.; orient in the Essay 
on Providence and a 'uture State, has insisted that 
the singular and unparalleled nature of the act of 
creation bars all possibility of drawing any analogy 
between it and ether events and Hume in the first per- 
son had already met the difficulty by a direct negative, 
"In a word, I much doubt whether it be possible for a 
"cause to be known only by its effect, or to be of 
"so singular and particular a nature as to have no 
"parallel and no similarity with any other cause or 
"object, that has ever fallen under our observation." 
And accordingly when stripped of the impossible de- 
mand for infinite experience the third objection of 
Philo to the anal.o,-ical armament returns upon the 
first and becomes a call for further explanation of 
the alleged similarity between human productive acti- 
vity as we observe it and the generation of an orderly 
universe. The "reasonin -s of too nice and delicate a 
"nature" upon which Hume had declined to enter in the 
Enquiry are forced upon him now when the whole ques- 
tion is being treated expressly. 
The method which Cleanthes adopts for overcoming 
his opponent's first objection is to minimise it. "It 
"is by no means necessary that Theists should prove the 
"similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; be- 
"cause this similarity is Self- evident and undeniable." 
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The proof, which Philo asks for, is not one that can 
oe reduced to the fc;imnes of logic; the first btep 
towards the inference of desivn :ïubt bet intuitive. 
The possibility of arguments of this logically irre- 
gular nature is proved says Cleanthes by their uni- 
versal and irresistible influence. If in the simplest 
inference from perception, for example, if when we infer 
from hearing a speech the fact that there was a speaker 
expressing his meaning in what we hear, it then be ob- 
jected that our inference cannot be expressed in 
accordance with the principles of logic and iauet there- 
fore be rejected, nothing remains but that fo:',n c.' 
absolute scepticism which both have already acreed to ab- 
jure. All conclusions concerning fact are founued 
arún experience and accordingly the iossiole validity 
of intuitive deductions from it, such as are every 
day drawn in common life, meet be admitted oy all nno 
taxe up the ; ositions r,eld oy- the two leaders in the 
Dialogues. Self evident intuition always accompanies 
experience and Cleanthes halos that his opponent's uc- 
naand for proof of the similarity Let iYeen creation and 
a work of human art implies a misapprehension of the 
essential nati,'c of the only possible assurance on that 
point. 
He gives two examples of i,n.nediate deductions 
which resemble the theistic inference. A voice being 
59 
heard, wbi.;ss is net mere a..t,d, but la articulate with 
meaning and instruction, is rat i cnal, wise, coherent, 
we at once conclude that it proceeds from reason and 
intelligence and in our conclusion it is a matter of 
indifference whether the sound be extracrdinaril;, loud 
and widespread or whether it be of the commonest kind. 
Again we read a book ens find it conveys a meaning and 
intention '..e conclude that it sprang from design. Let 
it be suirosed that books could be p.-opagated by natural 
generation and descent as plant a and animals are; 
aven than our reading still justifies our conclusion. 
Nature is like a library of books a,ddrea sed to cur 
minds in a universal language. "When it reasons and 
"discourses; when it expoatulat es argues and enforces 
"its views and topics; when it apj.lies sometimes to 
"the pure intellect, sometimes to the affections; when 
"it collects dib;.oseb and adorns every consideration 
"suited to the subject: could you persist in asserting 
"that all this at the bottom had really no moaning and 
"that the first formation of this volume in the loins 
"of its original parent proceeded nct from thought and 
"design ?" (402) To demand "proof" of the einilarity 
of the meaning of Nature to the meaning of language ib 
to demand the impossible. The self evident is in- 
demonstrable. "Consider, anatomize the eye" says 
Cleanthe6: "survey its structure and contrivance; and 
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"tell me, from your ovin feeling, if the idea cf a con - 
"trilier does not iii ediately flow in u,.n you with a 
"force like that of ser .hat cn. " And whatever object 
we set befcre ourselves teleologically, it is the same 
idea with the same fco ce that it su -gents. The 
crucial difficulty for Cleanthes is just the one to 
which this ult ii:rate position is a com 1et e answer it 
the Dialogues. Sc far the general current of the cce- 
vars t i on, as the present writer conceives it, has 
been concerned with the important quest _ c,., cf the cor- 
rect Method in teleological argument. And Hume in hie 
treatment of the cad well worn de icnstrat on of God's 
existence from the mechanism of the universe, repre- 
senta one at least of the three disputants to have pene- 
trated to the fundamental point cn which it all depends. 
An immediate self evident intuition with the same force 
as sensation cannot Ce demonstrated by the principles 
of logic and Cleanthes seems to have grasped to the 
full al] the bearings of his posit ion just as they were 
afterwards grasped, in treating of the theory of know- 
ledge generally, by those who replied to Hume. The 
power ofconviction :;here evidence of this kind is ad- 
duced is so great that logic is required not to dis- 
pute it but to account for it or admit it as best it 
can. The only question applicable to such evidence 
as Cleanthes pins his faith to is that of its occurrence 
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or non -occurrence in consciousness, and if we carry 
our survey of the aevelupment of the arrzument tu the 
cluse of the whole book we shall fina that this par- 
ticular question is always answered in an affirmative 
way. Cleanthes points out repeatedly that the hypo- 
thesis of design cannot be got rid of at any turn ana 
in the end Philo :adopts it himself fur his owe: con- 
clusions. The conclusion to design is exceedingly 
plain and simple according to Cleanthes, it may only 
give foundation for a very slight fabric of superaddea 
truth, but again even on that supposition both dis- 
putants declare themselves satisfied of its suffi- 
ciency. 
At the point in the Dialogues where this position 
is reached (in the end of Part III) Philo is repre- 
sented "as a little embarrassed aria corifourraed" and 
makes no reply to Cleanthes' final statement of his 
meaning, the questions which intervene between it 
and the resumption in the concluding Part of the 
thread of argument, here dropped aeal,with other 
issues. In the letter to Sir Gilbert Elliott already 
quoted, Hume himself divides the Dialogues at this 
point and advises his friend that he need gu no far- 
ther in order to apprehend his tique meaning. 
!le have already seen that it is Demea who diverts 
the continuity of trie argument at another point by 
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introducing as a sine issue the aiscussiuri on the a 
priori proofs of God's Being; so also it is he who 
gives the opening later un to the consideeatiun of the 
moral argument. And at the present juncture it was 
Demea again who "broke in upon the discourse" and 
saved Philo's coentenance. The interruption which is 
put into his mouth revives Ph-i lo' s eecuna objection tu 
the design argament exactly as it had already been ex- 
pressed by him and to the exposition of it the sceptic 
naturally turns the whole course of the debate but 
with Damea's disappearance at the close of Part XI he 
joins hands again with Cleanthes upon the conclusions 
reached thus early in the book. If then we are to 
interpret the Dialogues as expeessing any settled 
o; irions at all of the author we must infer that he 
considered the existence of design in Nature to be 
established either certainly or, at least, suffi- 
ciently by the appeal tu what is self-evident. 
So far then the author's procedure has been 
directed simply to prove that design is traced in 
nature by one of the sim.lest and most direct in- 
ferences of which Che human mind is capable. However 
no sooner has Cleanthes gained tris fient and must es- 
sential point than the difficulties which follow it 
are brought up with all the force of the authoe's best 
style. They are many and very diverse and sume of 
them are so evidently true to Hume's general attitude 
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on common subjects, they are treated at such length 
and with so much dialectical skill, that they ao un- 
doubtedly constitute a formidable attack from him upon 
the whole design argument and thus far justify the 
view ordinarily taken that the Dialogues are aiesctly 
anti -theistical in their tendency. Still it is only 
by selecting the finest and most subtle doubts which 
the hypothesis of design suggests to Philo, b,, ig- 
noring any ,unitive truths that both he ana Cle.intnes 
profess to accept about creating Intelligence and by 
overlooking altogether the :argument which leads up to 
them, that most of the references to the book in the 
history of philosop.y interpret it in the purely 
sceptical sense. Ari impartial verdict ought to hold 
both the positive affirmations, at least so far as 
they seem agreed upon, and the negative criticisms to- 
gether for a proper estimate of this contribution of 
Hume to the philosophy of theology. 
For the teleological argument as Hume conceived 
it really involves two aistinct mov .:ments of thought. 
The first is the argument to, or towards, Des ig n; 
which is meant to prove no more than that design ana 
a designing Intelligence of some sort must exist in 
the universe. The second is the : argument from Design; 
which follows the first and depends upon it; which 
seeks to define further the conception of designing 
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Intelligence by help of its works and in particular 
proceeds to enquire whether or not such In',,clligence 
can legitimately have predicated of it such attributes 
as personality and unit:. perfection and infinity, ur 
self -existence and omnipotence. The first movement 
may be exceedingly simple, the second always is ex- 
ceedingly involved. That Hume should have distin- 
guished the two and approved of the first while 
treating the second in a thoroughly sceptical manner 
does not seem to have occurred even as a possibility 
either to friendly or unfriendly critics. 
Accordingly no sooner has Cleanthes exp,,unded 
what he calls his "hypothesis of aesign" than Demea 
enquires whether it may not "render us presumptuous by 
"making us imagine we comprehend the Deity and have 
"some adequate idea of his nature and attributes ?" 
He restates Hume's own doctrine of the human Mind just 
as Philo had done in the,as yet undiscussed,objection 
to the design argument which we have already noticed. 
The human mind is nothing more than a succession of 
ideas united in one subject yet distinct, arranged 
for one moment yet constantly fleeting away, if Hume 
can explain it at all it is the product of natural 
forces. In its beginning it is observed daily to 
originate in generation and birth, in its course the 
machinery of thought is altered and even controlled by 
65 
external causes and accidental impressions, all that 
we know of its essence is that it seems dependent and 
not original or self supporting. If then Cleanthes 
maintains that there is evidence of the existence of a 
designing intelligence, both Demea and Philu a:e quite 
entitled on Hume's principles to ask how we can possi- 
bly suppose this divine Mind of his to be "the model 
"of the universe ". (396 and 404) Cleanthes is quite 
willing to be tied aown to affirming the similarity 
between the divine mind ana the human and says su with 
no uncertain voice. The creating Intelligence is 
"like the human" ana "the liker the better;" twice he 
declares "I know no other" (412) ana courageu,.sly tak- 
ing up this position with all the aifficulties attach- 
ing to it he allows the epithet of Anthropomorphism to 
be applied to his doctrine with indifference or even 
with his express approval. He hulas fast to his 
"first inferences" as Philo terms them later (420) 
and without reservation aeclares always for the pusi- 
tive consequences of the resemblance of the Divine tu 
the Human evan to the length of affirming of God 
weaknesses and imperfectiur:s and limitation by ne- 
cessity such as constantly are experienced in an. 
Philo un the other hand has no difficult task uri 
the negative side in showing "the inconveniences of 
"that Anthropomorphise;:" which his opi,unent has 
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embraced. It is here that the destructive criticism 
of the Dialoeues is really- to be fuar:a ana here that 
it is based upon Home's own settlea opinions. It was 
Kant's accurate and most just verdict upon the book ' 
that "all the arguii:eI: s in it aangeru:. i tu theism 
"centre round this one point of anthropomorphism " and 
yet the aun;rer from Philo is not so much tu C1eantnes' 
method of proof as to the :._caning to be rea into the 
conclus.f.on. In the wincing up .of the argument, 
where Philo acknowledges that the "existence of a 
"Deity is plainly ascertained by reason" he states 
quite plainly how much scone he will finally allow 
to the argument from Design. "If we are nut contentea 
"with calling the first and supreme cause a GOD or 
"DEITY but desire to var,) the expression; what can we 
"call him b t MIND or THOUGHT, to which he is justly 
"sup....osa to bear a considerable resemblance." (457) 
This clearly is to admit the bare elements of his 
opponent's second contention,that the deign_r.g In- 
telligence is like in kind tu the haman mir:a,ana Philo 
goes on to define the question bet?e,Jn them as one of 
the aegree of resemblance. This presents itself tu 
him conveniently as a species of verbal cuntrovevsy 
"which from the very nature of language and of human 
"ideas is involved in rerpe:.ùal ambiguity ana can 
Prolegomena 57 
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"never, by any precaution or any definitions be able 
"to reach a reasonable certainty or precisiun." ' 
It is generally admitted that in he history of the 
teleological argument, the greatest error of its ex- 
ponents has been their uncritical tenaency to press 
the anthro*iomorphic analogy to unreasonable lengths, 
and in this respect their license requi_es always to 
be curtailed. When Philo in the Dialogues undertakes 
this task, it is done thoroughly enough, the argument 
is confined within limits narrower than those it com- 
monly is inflated to fill, but that process of com- 
pression is by no means one of annihilation, although 
by entering upon a question of degree as 
"biguous" as those referred to by Hume any one may 
easily persuade himself of the contrary. It is just 
in conceiving the Deity after the likeness of iii that 
the strength of the teleological argument lies and 
weakness. For its proper treatment it is essential 
that both sides shoula be accurately aisplayca ana in 
this respect the Dialogues seem t,, afford an e celler.t 
example of systematic anal,,-sis. 
The first inconvenience of the anthropomorphic ex- 
planation of oraer in the universe is that it reed rout 
be taken to be final or coru_ìlete. Human reason itself 
For this doctrine in a modern form cf., Bradley, 
Appearance and Reality p. 53Z. "It is better to af- 
"firm personality than to call the Absolute impersonal. 
"But neither mistake should be necessary." 
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is held by Philo not to be self dependent; we may 
not know or be able to explain the causes why its 
ideas arrange themselves in order to form plans 
towards its ends but we have no more r i n*ht to at- 
tribute that power of arranging to a rational faculty 
inherent in mind than we have to attribute order to 
an orderly faculty in otPr natural powers. Philo 
therefore having no theory of reason as a real entity 
independent of the ideas passions and sensations, 
which "succeed each other" in it, has no theory to 
account for the falling into order of "the different 
ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme Being." 
(409). Their order or arrangement require and de- 
mand an explanation just as much as the order in the 
visible world. "The first step we take leads us on 
"for ever. When you go one step beyond the mun- 
I 
dane system, you only excite an inquisitive humour 
"which it is impossible ever to satisfy." To him 
Cleanthes' explanation of the form of the world by a 
Divine Intelligence appears only "to shove off the 
"difficulty" for a moment and to account for what we 
observe by means of a cause itself unaccountable. 
It sets up an infinite series of deductions in which 
the same thing always remains unexplained. "If the 
"material world rests upon a similar ideal world, 
"this ideal world must rest upon some other and so on 
"without end." 
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Cleanthes however refuses to be drawn into this 
discussion of the possibility of an infinite tracing 
out of the causes of design. 'Even in common life, 
"if I assign a cause for any event; is it any objec- 
tion that I cannot assign the cause of that cause 
"and answer every new question which may incessantly 
"be started ?" (410). His first step is not the 
beginning of an endless journey from hypothesis to 
hypothesis "entirely in the air," as he terms such 
procedure in another connection (441), it is an im- 
mediate inference to design and a designing Mind and 
with an obvious hit at his opponent he asks what 
philosophers could possibly insist upon demanding the 
cause of every cause, "philosophers who confess ul- 
"timate causes to be totally unknown." Cleanthes 
does not attempt to give a theory of reason in opposi- 
tion to Philo's,-no doubt the author felt the im- 
possibility of representing him in that râle, -he only 
denies that there is any need for him to do so. 
'You ask me the cause of my intelligent cause.' "I 
"know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I 
"have found a Deity and here i stop my enquiry. Let 
"those go further who are wiser or more enterprising." 
Philo therefore quits this around of objection 
in the Dialogues and a little later in the course of 
his own attempt to give a naturalistic theory of 
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order when he is asked by Demea to offer some ul- 
timate explanation of the vegetative principle, which 
he prefers to the intelligent cause of all (424), he 
explicitly refers to the nature of the agreement 
reached by Cleanthes and himself. For Cleanthes it 
was considered sufficient if the first step is sup- 
ported by experience. He himself takes the same 
ground and maintains that it is undeniable that 
Vegetation and Generation as well as Reason are ex- 
perienced to be principles of order in nature. "If 
"I rest my system of cosmogony on the former prefer- 
"ably to the latter, 'tis at my choice. The matter 
"seems entirely arbitrary. And when Cleanthes asks 
me (which of course he has not done) the cause of 
"my great vegetative or generative faculty, I am 
"equally entitled to ask him the cause of his great 
"reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed 
"to forbear on both sides; and it is chiefly his 
"interest on the present occasion to stick to this 
"agreement." The dispute between pure naturalism 
and Theism is not to be decided against either by the 
respective difficulties of explaining the essential 
operations and internal structure of natural forces 
on the one hand or of Reason on the other. In both 
cases there is the same inconvenience and while Philo is 
left to say that "an ideal system arranged of itself 
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"without a precedent design, is not a whit more ex- 
plicable than a .naterial one," the dispute is not 
made one .:hit clearer. by this tarticular method of 
comparing their merits. 
The battle on this pcint then is left dral:n and 
a lasting- trace called by mutual cor_ sent. But with 
the suggestion of the possibility of a naturalistic 
derivation of reason the way is open for a pure 
Eaturalisa to claim an equal right with the most re- 
fined spiritual interpretation of the world and the 
discussion in the Dialogues gradually veers round to 
a balancing of these two alternatives. 
The argument from design is first of all con- 
siderably reduced in its weight by the losses which 
its conception of the Deity undergoes in direct con- 
sequenc of its anthropomorphic aie,.hod of conceiving 
him. In.finity, perfection, unity and omnipotence, 
in fact all the transcendent attributes usually con- 
nected with the idea of God are implicitly denied in 
affirming his likeness to man,and in fact no part of 
the design argument is directed to prove them. It 
proceeds upon the strictly empirical method and there- 
fore is doomed from the first to fall snort of attri- 
butes ..hick apply to nothing we experience in observ- 
ing real things. No co:Lbination of the evidences of 
design can ever prove the "unity" of the Designer, 
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that very term "unity" being a 'fictitious denoAina- 
tion' and no addition of thaw can reach to His in- 
finity. To all Philo's suppositions of possible 
ways of conceiving the Deity or deities without these 
attributes, Cleanthes accordingly has no answer, save 
to point out that none of then "gat rid of tie hypo- 
thesis of design." He never abuses his argument 
by pretending that it proves more than it can reach, 
indeed he has his own objections to using the word 
infinite which savours more of paner7yric than cf 
philosophy and should be replaced by more accurate 
and more moderate expressions, (444), in which our 
knowledge of God approximates to the comprehension of 
His perfection representing His wisdom and power as 
greater than any other that we know, without procuad- 
ing to define them as infinitely great.` The argument 
from design reaches a conception of God that may be 
lofty yet it can never attain to the conception of an 
Infinite; it defines His qualities by similarity with 
finite things, and that being its professed aim, it 
accepts cheerfully those inconveniences ..hich arise 
from its not attaining a fuller result than it actually 
seeks after. At this stage cf ar -ument+ Philo 
An empirical philosophy must. always take the idea 
of infinity to be reached by way of approximation, a 
method which derives confirmation fro::: its use in 
Euclidean geometry. 
' Part VI. 
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touches upon the alternative of having recourse to a 
Pantheism not so much as a possibility for himself 
as for nis opponent. Ha expresses himself unwilling 
to defend any particular system of this nature, yet 
because it is "at lest a theory that .:,ust, sooner 
"or later, have recourse to whatever syste:_: .ia em- 
brace" it cannot be overlooked. The classical notion 
of the Soul of the world is introduced because it has 
the apparent advantage of rel'resentirg the fora and 
order of the universe to be coeval and conterminous 
with the matter. It has therefore many points of 
kinship ,pith Clearithes' teleological Theis.:i and is 
indeed as Philo remarks "a new species cf Anthropo- 
"mo rphi sm. " It excels just in emphasising the in- 
herent nature of the eternal principles of order in 
the world and in treating their connection with it 
organically rather than mechanically. 
But hume does not discuss the possibilities of 
a spiritual Pan -theism at any length, he makes Philo 
accept the suggestion cf Cleanthes that "the world 
"seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable 
"than to an animal" and because it is to the former 
a matter of indifference whether we hold the original 
inherent principle of order to be in thought or in 
,matter, he abandons at once the only part which in the 
doctrine of a World Soul attributes Reason to it. A 
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spiritual Pan -theism al-.ays suggests itself as an 
easy variation upon Theism and we 'nay shrewdly suspect 
it was introduced in the Dialogues only as a temporary 
suggestion in order to lead up to Pan -materialism. 
Hitherto Philo has confined hi:1self to pointing 
out "the inconveniences "4of his friend's Anthropo- 
morphism but now in expounding a purely naturalistic 
or materialistic hypothesis of order he recognises 
that his attack is no longer upon 'the consequences' 
of the design argument but upon 'the first inferences' 
from which it all depends. The real enemy of Theism 
is ï1:aturalism. Both start from the same base in 
the observed fact of the presence of order in the 
world,but from this common point of agreement they 
derive principles that are altogether irreconciliable. 
For one party the first step is to prove that order 
implies design, for the other it is to point out 
that order is derived from purely irrational prin- 
ciples,and the divergence which commences with the 
first step leads on to complete opposition. The two 
views cannot possibly be combined, one must be allowed 
and the other denied; and yet the careful reader of 
the Dialogues will not find therm brought for :ard with 
the aim of having their respective merits decided. 
Naturalism is not a system to which Philo is at all 
pp. 407, 411. 
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inclined to commit himself unreservedly,and his 
method of discussing it is to point oizt,how very 
similar its analogies and inferences are to those cf 
Theism and how little argument the ad'__ -3rents of one 
theory can bring auaiLst the other without destroying 
the validity cf their own reasonings. In his con- 
clusions on this point his inconsistency is more 
lainly Narked Lazan elsewhere in the whole book for 
while in holding the balance even between Naturalism 
and Theism, he maintains that "a total suspense of 
"judgment is here our only reasonable resource" ( 430) 
and prides himself on having no fixed station or abid- 
ing city to defend; ::is judgment in the end is given 
;ithout further trial. in favour of one side. 
The parallel which Philo draws between r,ethods 
and grounds of the two opposing schemes is most com- 
plete. We hava experience,not only of :reason as a 
principle of order in the world,but cf other principles 
such as Instinct, Generation, Vegetation, and perhaps 
a hundred mora which undoubtedly exist, and also do 
certainly have some degree of a conserving* and develop- 
ing power,such as is required to maintain the meat 
fabric of the whole. The universe resembles a :uachine : 
but it also resembles countless objects which are 
independent of human agency, a spider's web spun by 
instinct, a vegetable sprouting up from its seed, an 
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animal developing out of an egg. The resemblances 
in each case are striking, all of them have commended 
themselves to the judgment of mankind in history, who 
then shall decide between them? None of the analogies 
drawn from them pretend to be final but stop short of 
defining the ultimate causes of the world. Reason, 
instinct, vegetation even Nature arN all alike in- 
explicable and no one principle can justly claim a 
preference to the others. 
Philo therefore claims the right to be in- 
different in choosing whether he will ascribe priority 
to thought or to matter. Experience can hardly de- 
cide the question, abstract Reason is not to be 
trusted because it is not an impartial judge; no 
possible touchstone can be brought to bear upon what 
we observe and therefore we ought to ban all specula - 
tion,theistic and naturalistic alike. 
This negative conclusion of itself sets limits 
to pure naturalism but Hume proceeds to show how 
cautiously, even in the most speculative mood,any 
advocate of naturalism crust approach his questions 
and how many dangers beset his most familiar paths. 
Philo undertakes for a moment to expound that evolu- 
tionary theory of order,on which modern naturalism 
is most commonly based one with which in every age 
naturalism has been so closely connected as even to 
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be wholly identified with it. It is attempted to 
ascribe all the multiplicity and adjustment now 
observable in the world to an origin in the simplest 
elements possible and while Philo allows only "a 
"faint appearance of probability" to such a theory, 
he anticipates its most systematic statement so com- 
pletely as to contain probably all the essential 
points in it. 
Order is to be evolved out of disorder by blind 
unreasoning force and if this can be done the grounds 
of the Theistic inference from design disappear al- 
to'ether and only a naturalism or a materialism re- 
mains. 
Only three elements are demanded for his,new 
hypothesis of 'cosmogony'; matter, motion, and 
eternity in time. The first two,ali sciences hold 
to be constant in their quantity; we turn to ex- 
perience and "there is not probably, at present, in 
"the whole universe, one particle of matter at ab- 
solute rest." An infinite duration in time is 
perhaps only a supposition but it is a possible one. 
We turn again to experience and find that there 
actually is a system, an order, 'an occonomy of 
'things by which matter can preserve that perpetual 
'agitation which seems essential to it and yet main- 
tain a constancy in the forms which it produces.' 
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With the possibility of infinite transpositions all 
orders are possible, unstable positions pass away and 
decay; total or partial chaos ensues; 'till finite, 
'though innumerable revolutions produce at last some 
'forms, whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to 
'support the forms amidst a continued succession of 
'matter; the present world therefore can be con- 
ceived as a stage in the history of matter seeking 
form and 'by its very nature that order, when once 
'established, supports itself for many ages, if not 
'to eternity.' Possibility and actuality therefore 
agree, the conclusion is simple. 'Wherever matter 
'is so poised, arranged and adjusted, as to continue 
'in perpetual motion and yet preserve a constancy in 
'the forms, its situation must of necessity have all 
'the same appearance of art and contrivance which we 
'observe.' If we turn from the inorr'anic to the 
organic in Nature Hume has no theory such as later 
was used to account for the development of species 
but Philo shadows forth that very idea,which lies at 
the root of it of order being 'requisite for the 
'subsistence' of the individual. "It is in vain to 
insist upon the uses of the parts in animals or 
"vegetables and their curious adjustment to each 
Other. I would fain know, how an animal could sub - 
"sist unless its parts were so adjusted? Do we not 
"find that it immediately perishes whenever this 
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"adjustment ceases and that its matter corrupting 
"tries some new fern ?" 
On this line of argument the theory of the evo- 
lution cf order in the universe by natural laws of 
self development must inevitably disperse with a refer - 
ence to design and probably would do so altogether in 
modern times were it not the case that modern teleo- 
logy has widened her outlook upon creation, is willing 
to walk in imagination as far backward along the course 
of the world's development as the evolutionist is able 
to lead her, but only demands that he shall not mini - 
mize the nature of the primitive elements nor ignore 
the fact that they really involve all the multiplicity 
of adjustment in themselves as truly as their latest 
combinations do. But whatever may be the true way of 
reconciling the evolutionary and naturalistic explana- 
tion of order with the inference to design, the Dia- 
logues indicate one possible reply to the evolutionary 
theory by which the need for á. reconciliation may be 
avoided altogether. And because the hypothesis of 
evolution, in the Dialogues is admittedly 'incomplete 
and imperfect' being a side issue 'suggested on a 
sudden in the course cf the argument', we have only 
to state Hume's partial reply to it - a reply which 
is perfectly valid in its own place after a century 
and a half of steady advance ir. speculation. 
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The proposition that everything which exists must 
be subject to order is not convertible directly into 
this other, that the only purpose cf order is to con- 
serve existence. The first is obviously within ex- 
perience, the second would require confirmation from 
an analysis of each individual instance of order and 
could be disproved by one single case ih which order 
is not an indispensable condition of bare life. These. 
says Hume, though in general very frugal in "ature. 'are 
far from being rare.' He mentions only the physical 
conveniences and advantages which men possess but one 
might add all the aesthetic and intellectual pleasures 
so profitable, so necessary for the perfection of man's 
nature and then ask his question: without all these 
"would human society and the human kind have been im- 
"nn iately extinguished ?" And one proved instance of 
order where existence is not made more secure but 
rather more pleasurable and more complete by it "is a 
"sufficient proof of design and of a benevolent design 
"which gave rise to the order and arranFemant cf the 
"universe." But the whole tenour of the evolutionary 
hypothesis is that all order without exception arises 
from the natural predisposition of all species that 
are generative towards the securing of life. Cleanthes 
does not question that such a power does operate in 
the world, he only denies that it is sufficient to 
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account for E.11 cf the innumerable forms that are 
made known tc us in experience, and Philo allows his 
contention. without hesitation. 
With this partial `indication of design against 
pure naturalise: Hume leaves the question between then 
apparently undecided. It is not further argued; 
indeed Philo's view of it is that no amount cf argu- 
ment can ever completely prove the one or completely 
discredit the other. If it comes to a question cf 
probability, of balancing the reasons for either side, 
if it is possible in his own phrase to "believe that 
the arguments on which a theory of design is estab- 
"lished exceed the objections, which lie agaiLst it," 
if in fact a definite conclusion is demanded for 
common life, as conclusions are demanded every moment 
on questions less lofty than theology, then Philo's 
judgment is not suspended but becomes a "plain philo- 
sophical assent." But that the assent should be 
so plainly given from the Sceptic's side as it is in 
the Dialogues, is in itself proof cf a distinct posi- 
tive advance on the specula-_icns cf Hume's early years. 
There is however one point on which the Dialogues 
yield only a negative result, and strangely enough 
it is the very argument from the idea of morality 
.hich Kant also excepted from the remainder of his 
critique of theology, treating it favourably and 
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endeavouring to give it a deeper setting among the 
necessary posulates of reason. Hume recc`_ni;.es 
quite fully the need for a conception of God which 
will harmonize with our highest ethical standards. 
Cleanthes is made to say expressly, "To what purpose 
"establish the natural attributes of the Deity while 
"the moral are still doubtful and uncertain ?" In 
his desire to secure this and he would willingly em- 
brace the only method of supporting divine benevolence 
which he can conceive possible, namely, "to deny ab- 
"solutely the misery and wickedness of men." But 
optimism is not a cloak that will fit Hume as it did 
Leibnitz. The world never presents itself to him at 
any time as a scene in which the good preponderates 
over the evil - even in the least degree - much less is 
it purely and unmixedly good. It is not a picture in 
which unpleasant shadov.s and jarring contrasts are used 
only in order to accentuate the brightness and harmony 
of the main subject so that the whole work "is one of 
beauty, it is rather an unfinished daub, parts of which 
might possibly be praised in isolation, but t:e neater 
proportion of its surface ought to be covered up, And 
therefore C1_:anthes abandons all claim of moral rer- 
fection for God; He is 'regulated by wisdom', desires 
to be benevolent but is 'limited by necessity.' The 
natural operations that we observe at :cork in life 
might easily have heen bettered by omnipotent Goodness 
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and made more conformable to our conceptions cf right 
without any less to the other products of design. 
Four ways cf morally ai!1endir.g the r resent order suggest 
themselves to our author. Pleasure night to employed 
to excite all creatures to self -preservation: in every 
case where the present means is pain;' general laws 
might be made less rigid where their effects are cruel 
and unfair, the powers and faculties for cod and 
happiness night be increased; excessive I assicns in 
man and unbridled power in Mature might he regulated 
and controlled sc that all convulsions and revolutions 
s?- ould he impossible. As we read the pages of the 
Dialogues we seem to hear an echo of the ironical 
pessimism of Voltaire and _Bolingbroke and they evident- 
ly express his confirmed and settled attitude to the 
worth of life in his mature as in hls early years. 
And Hume saa in the light of dispassionate reaso'., how 
little this sup ests the existence of an indulgent 
fatherly love ruling the universe with a direct interest 
in the welfare cf its creatures; it is rather "a blind 
"nature impregnated by a great vivifying principle and 
"pouring forth from her lap without discernment or 
Only a Paley could base any arg:ment upon the 
inverse consideration that pleasure seems superadded 
for purposes which 'might have been effected by the 
operation of pain;' - which is small consolation for 
the ills of life. 'Tat. Theol. Cap. 2r. 
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"parental care, her maimed and abortive children." 
So far as our experience of Reality goes we cannot lean 
to any extreme theory of the moral qualities it ex- 
presses. We cannot suppose them perfectly good or 
perfectly bad, we dare not suppose them mixed and 
opposite for that means conflict and contradiction, we 
can only suppose that good and evil are illusions and 
that all real things are indifferent. 
This antitheistic conclusion (for Hume admits it 
to be so) is entirely in accordance with his general 
theory of morals and his contemporaries were not slow 
to lay their finger upon the point at issue. All 
moral judgments for Hume depend upon the natural 
psychology of man. In political and social ethics 
we conceive right and wrong only because certain ends 
are agreed upon, have been customary and are accepted 
as such. Certain rules of conduct appear 'useful' 
for these ends and therefore we distinr*uish them as 
being right. In the ethics of the individual also,we 
have rio reason for making any judgment except through 
the arbitrary constitution of the human mind; so that 
as Reid says* "by a change in our structure, what is 
"immoral might become moral, virtue might be turned into 
"vice and vice into virtue." The unessential nature 
of moral distinctions for Hume had already been illus- 
trated in his other writings,notably in that one,which 
Active Powers, Essay V. c. 7. 
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bears the title "A Dialogue ", anni therefore Reid 
adds justly, "Mr Hume seems perfectly consi tent 
"with himself, in allowing of no evidence for the 
"moral attributes of the Supreme Being whatever there 
"may be for his natural attributes." And therefore 
it is to the nature of his theory of morals that we 
must trace the motive of his one objection to Natural 
Religion. 
If then in beholding the natural order of the 
world Hume is moved to despair, the inward moral 
order in mari cannot bring him relief. For it,ac- 
cording to him,is arbitrary and fluctuating and has 
no independent authority. "What T have said con- 
cerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little 
or no variation; and we have no more reason to 
"infer that the rectitude of the Supreme Being re- 
"sembles human rectitude than his benevolence re- 
sembles the human." And so his negative to the 
moral argument in Natural Religion is complete. 
Probably had his scepticism here been less unmis- 
takeably his own reasoned verdict, it might have 
been taken for a grand satire upon the popular 
theology of his own day. In it the wretchedness 
and wickedness of men were favourite topics and the 
darkest shadows in Hume's pessimism are bright in 
comparison to the absolute blackness pictured by 
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orthodox divines when they referred to the estate of 
sin and misery that resulted from the Fall. It was 
only Hume's fearless logic that warned then- of the 
atheism implied in their moanings; he himself seems 
content to rest in the conclusion he had drawn from 
premisses,which at least were his own whether others 
shared them or not. 
In whatever way it may be possible to restate 
the moral argument, Hume's judgment of it in the 
form in which he conceived it is unfavourable. Even 
the earliest direct reply to the Dialogues, that of 
Milner in 1781, points out how far Hume's general 
position in ethics is accountable for this phase of 
his speculation. Conscience and the very intuitive 
nature of the moral sense are not taken into his 
view at all ,and yet there are "final causes in the 
"moral world as obvious as in the administration of 
"the natural world." " And with the deepening 
sense of the reality of moral distinctions and moral 
laws, the nature of the moral argument has changed 
rapidly in modern times and the ascription of ethical 
perfection to God is on every side considered to be 
an indispensable and essential condition of any 
expression of belief in Him. 
With Hume the consciousness of such a necessity 
Milner's Answer, sect. 12. 
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is not :resent and in summing up briefly the net re- 
sult of the Dialogues we must bear his difficulty 
carefully in mind. The total of agreement between 
the two principals is not very great in extent. They 
both accept the argument from design and it alone for 
all we know of God. They find evidence everywhere of 
the presence of are active ordering Intelligence, a 
creative Reason,, a " ind; this is all we know of God 
and therefore in this form it is we must worship Him. 
If we are pleased to call Him good, it is with this 
reservation that &oodness in God is less like goodness 
as we know it than His Reason is like ours. "The 
"moral qualities in marl are more defective in their 
"kind than his natural abilities." Analogy which 
formerly enabled us to discover the admitted truth 
fails us now, to describe the ,,oral qualities of lod, 
there is no evidence for them as there undoubtedly is 
for His designing Irtelli ence. Let us cherefore 
call Him ::.ind and for the redo keep silence and relieve. 
This is the final message of Hume's latest utterance 
on the greatest question of the ages. We should be 
wrong if we claimed that it contained more - unjust 
if we supposed it contained less. 
In their closing paragraphs the Dialogues call 
us away from the speculations cf pure theology to 
the practical arplicaticu cf divine n4th in life. 
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He had as little sympathy as his con :e:__púrary, the 
poet Burns, with the awful dcctries of a God all 
power and fore -kno ledc e, ruling by terror cf hell 
and hope of Y eaven, with "devils and to! rents of 
"fire and bri_ »stoke," in which "the da_::I:ed are in- 
"fnitely superior ir. number to the elect," all the 
crude Calvinistic dogma so prevalent among his fellow 
country -men from which they hoped to derive some 
guidance for their conduct on The Way. In his opinion 
it overlooked the importance of the ordinary virtues, 
neglecting them in order to concentrate attention upon 
eternal salvation, even holding that they are un- 
essential and unmeaning. To him it serves only as 
an example of false religion with consequences per- 
nicious ir. society and utterly atruuralisin, in the 
individual, only a little better than no rAl i c'I c at 
all, a superstition with a kernel of truth encased in 
a shell of doctrines that can and ought; to h cost away. 
For the false Hume aculd substitute now as the 
true that conception of religion running- through 
all his writircs fren the earliest to vhe latest, 
according to which we assent to the eisterce of 
God and for t' -e rest give all our energies to the 
practice cf ;:ralIL :,. "The e r roper office cf re] i -ion 
"is to regulate the heart cf o1c:I , h:manize their 
"conduct, infuse the spirit cf teniTerance, order and 
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"obedience; and as itf operatic: is silent and only 
"enforces the moti v's of _ orals t and justice it is 
"in danger of being overlooked and confounded 
"these other motives. When it distin- uishes _itself, 
"and acts as a separate p ri nc .ipla over ::e -, it has de- 
parted frou its 7.rcrer sphere and has cnl_ a 
"cover to faction ano au i' ion." iCt C(..Cer. j j 
with dogmatising abort t :'ia ' and :i' S-..... ious attri- 
butes of Gcd or the incomprehensible decrees cf His 
Providence as though some necessity lay upon us to 
profess complete knowledge of Hier:, relic -ion is for 
Hume in the first place a simple faith and a present 
rule of conduct in the rrasent life. It has a certain 
limited knowledge cf Gol derived by reason acrki!w in 
the realm of experience; no doubts can tape that much 
array, but out beyond there always lips for Hirne .r13r1 
he c-oes dearest search for truth ',he real!,! of 
faith and revelation. The last word of the Dialoç oes 
is a cry for it, the only refuge for human reason from 
its ignorance and imperfections. So also ends the 
Enquiry, so also the Essay o ; the I i-nortality of the 
Compare ai th this passage of the 1)ialop?ues the 
following, from the History of Treat L,ri ain VIT., 
p. 450:- "The proper office of religion is to reform 
"men's lives, to purify their hearts, to inforce 
"all moral duties and to secure obedience to the 
"laws of the civil magistrate." 
9r 
Soul. For Religion that has to do with concrete life 
lived in the clear sense of P,od's existence must 
surely end either in a claim of _,erfect knowledge or 
else in just such a cry. Though Hume nowhere de- 
fines these terms of faith and revelation anù nowhere 
gives an alalysis of their use, I see no reason why 
in choosing the second of these alternatives he should 
be deemed inconsistent or insincere. 
And if from the purely historical paint of view 
the closing lines of the Dialogues be considered 
their author's last utterance in speculation they 
may be taken to indicate how to the very end the 
natural man strove with the philosopher in Hume's 
thought and left him dissatisfied still. 
